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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE ACTION-YEO V. TOWN
LEXINGTON: High School Student Editors as State Actors

OF

Even were we to adopt such [a flexible] approach . . . [to state
action by keying it to the offensiveness of the constitutional com
plaint,] we would be inclined to group infringements of funda
mental rights and racial discrimination together ... just as they
receive comparable scrutiny in equal protection cases. 1
INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution restricts only conduct by the
state or federal government, not conduct by private individuals. 2
Constitutional guarantees, in other words, protect individuals only
from "state action,"3 not from private action. Thus, before a court
1. Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 6 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978).
2. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads in rele
vant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Since its enactment, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted this Amendment as outlining "the essential dichotomy
set forth in that Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny
under its provisions, and private conduct, 'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against
which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,A19 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883». In the
Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court wrote the following:
[Clivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggres
sion, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by
State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceed
ings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is
simply a private wrong ....
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17. There are two exceptions to this rule about state
action: the Thirteenth Amendment and certain privileges afforded United States citi
zens. For further discussion, see infra note 14.
3. It is probably clearer just to say "government action" since the requirement
applies to federal, state, and local governments. However, to avoid confusion with the
language of the cases, this Note will use the expression "state action" throughout.
The phrase "state action" is a misnomer because the issue arises in an identical
manner when the federal government or its agents are involved in a case ....
[AlII problems relating to the existence of government action-local, state, fed
eral-which would subject an individual to constitutional restrictions come
under the heading of "state action."
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can determine whether a private citizen's constitutional right has
been violated, it must first determine whether the state was respon
sible for the challenged action.
Typically, courts do not have trouble finding state action when
the state or a particular state official causes the alleged constitu
tional violation. Finding state action is more difficult, however,
when a private individual allegedly violates a constitutional right,
and the aggrieved party attempts to characterize the wrongdoer as a
state actor. If the aggrieved party can convince a court that the
private wrongdoer's action may be fairly attributed to the state,
then the court will find state action and analyze the merits of the
constitutional challenge. But if no state action is found, the court
will dismiss the constitutional challenge and never hear the merits
of the case.
In Yeo v. Town of Lexington,4 Douglas Yeo, a town resident,
parent, and founder of Lexington Parents Information Network
("LEXNET"), submitted an advertisement to two Lexington High
School ("LHS") publications, the LHS Yearbook, and the LHS
Musket-a student newspaper. 5 Both publications refused to run
his ad. 6 Yeo filed suit on the ground that this refusal violated his
First Amendment right to free speech.7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held, however, that no First AmendJOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1, at 470-71
(5th ed. 1995). Moreover, "the requirement may be satisfied by action of counties,
municipalities, and other local government entities such as special districts. All such
branches of local government are considered agencies of the State." Russell W. Gallo
way, The Government-Action Requirement in American Constitutional Law, 30 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 935, 935 n.6 (1990); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI
TUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688 n.2 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he words 'state action' will denote
action by any level of government, from local to national.").
4. 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
5. The advertisement read as follows:
We know you can do it!
ABSTINENCE: The Healthy Choice
Sponsored by: Lexington Parents InfornIation Network (LEXNET)
Post Office Box 513, Lexington Massachusetts 02173.
[d. at 244. See infra Part II.A for further discussion of the facts of Yeo.
6. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 247.
7. See id. at 248. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Specifically, Yeo alleged a civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
reads, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni
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ment violation occurred because the decision to reject the ad did
not constitute state action. 8 The court found that high school stu
dent editors, acting independently, made the decision, and that the
students' decision could not be fairly attributed to any school offi
ciaL9 As a result, the case was dismissed.lO
This Note examines Yeo in an effort to determine whether,
under the facts of Yeo, independent actions of public high school
students may constitute state action. Part I provides an introduc
tion to the state action doctrine, paying particular attention to its
current formulations and its application to high school free speech
cases. Part II presents the principal case of Yeo v. Town of Lexing
ton. This Part presents the relevant facts of Yeo, and traces and
explains the court's reasoning from the district court level to the en
banc decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.
Part III critically evaluates the First Circuit's majority opinion
in Yeo. First, this Part suggests that the First Circuit's majority
opinion used a heightened standard for finding state action, a se
quential approach,u instead of a more liberal standard, the totality
approach,12 because the court assumed that state action standards
should vary with the offensiveness of the constitutional claim at
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.c. § 1983 (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added); see also Yeo, 131 F.3d at 248. As a
general rule, the "under color [of law)" requirement of § 1983 is "treated as the same
thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922,935 n.18 (1982) (overturning an appellate court which treated the under color and
state action analyses as separate, and finding "the under color-of-state-law requirement
does not add anything not already included within the requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); Barrios-Velazquez v. Asociacion de Empleados, 84 F.3d 487, 490-91 (1st
Cir. 1996) (treating the two analyses the same). The Yeo court followed this practice by
treating the "under color of law" requirement of § 1983 as equivalent to the state action
requirement. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 248 n.3.
8. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 255.
9. See id. at 253-55.
10. The First Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the decision of the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, see Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94
10811-RGS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *15 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996), and reversed
its prior panel decision, which had found state action and a First Amendment violation.
See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *2 (1st Cir. June 6,
1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
As such, the en banc decision did not address the merits of the First Amendment issue,
with the exception of Chief Judge Torruella's concurring opinion which asserted that no
First Amendment violation had occurred. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 255-56.
11. See infra Part LA.3 for a discussion of the sequential approach.
12. See infra Part LA.2 for a discussion of the totality approach.
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stake. Second, this Part challenges the majority's use of this height
ened standard by examining the court's assumption that courts
should vary state action standards according to the offensiveness of
the constitutional violation alleged. It argues that keying state ac
tion standards to particular constitutional rights is inappropriate be
cause it undermines judicial accountability and fails to give equal
consideration to all alleged fundamental rights violations. Third,
this Part suggests that instead of varying state action standards with
the type of constitutional right at stake, courts should use an "Equal
Consideration Approach" for state action analysis, namely, they
should apply the liberal state action standard to all alleged funda
mental rights violations. Finally, this Part suggests that under the
facts of Yeo, applying this liberal standard would support a finding
of state action. As such, the Note concludes that state action should
have been found in Yeo, and the case should have been decided on
the merits.
I.

A.

FINDING STATE ACTION

The State Action Doctrine

This section will introduce the United States Supreme Court's
state action doctrine, its recent formulations, and its application to
public high schools in particular,13
In almost all constitutional cases, the plaintiff must prove that a
state actor, or someone whose action may be fairly attributed to the
state, deprived him of a constitutional right. 14 The state action
13. For a thorough discussion of the history of the state action doctrine, see G.
Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for
Governmental Responsibility, Part I, 34 Hous. L. REv. 333 (1997), and G. Sidney
Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Govern
mental Responsibility, Part II, 34 Hous. L. REv. 665 (1997). For more general discus
sions of the doctrine, see Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and
the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L.
REv. 1053,1053 n.l (1990) (providing a generous list of state action articles); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta
Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1995); NOWAK & Ro
TUNDA, supra note 3, at § 12; 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16 (2d ed. 1992); TRIBE,
supra note 3, at § 18; Galloway, supra note 3; Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Inco
herence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 683 (1984); and Dilan A.
Esper, Note, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 663
(1995).
14. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) ("[M]ost rights se
cured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments.");
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (stating that the Court has
affirmed "the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth] Amendment between
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question requires little analysis when a state official engaged in the
challenged conduct. Typically, when a state official caused the con
stitutional infringement, state action is presumed.1 5
Finding state action is more difficult where a private individual
caused the alleged constitutional violation. 16 Recently, the United
States Supreme Court stated that a court should make two inquiries
in determining whether state action is present in such casesP First,
a court should ask "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation
resulted from the exercise of some right or privilege having its
source in state authority."18 Under this inquiry, a court must deter
mine whether the state provided the means, vis-a-vis a state created
deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct,
'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers
no shield"); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 as unconstitutional since the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress relied on
to enforce the Act's prohibition against discrimination in public accommodations, only
reaches state and not private action).
There are two exceptions to the state action requirement. The first involves the
Thirteenth Amendment, which applies to both state and private action. A person
claiming he has been subject to slavery or involuntary servitude need not prove state
action. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (finding discrimina
tion by private real estate developer violated the 1866 Civil Rights Act because the
drafters intended the Act to apply to both private and public discriminatory acts since
that purpose is rationally related to eradicating slavery or its badges or incidents pursu
ant to the Thirteenth Amendment). The second exception involves certain privileges
afforded to United States citizens, such as the use of the public roads for interstate
travel. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 765 (1966) (upholding an application
of the criminal conspiracy provision of the Civil Rights Act to private individuals who
attempted to deprive black persons of the right to enjoy public facilities connected with
interstate travel).
15. See 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CiVIL RIGHTS AND CiVIL LmERTIES LfTIGA
TION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 2.04, at 62 (3d ed. 1991) ("The easy cases in which
to find state action are those where a state employee acting on behalf of the state pursu
ant to state authority thereby brings about plaintiffs constitutional deprivation.").
However, the presumption will not hold where the government official is not acting in
his or her official capacity, or is performing an independent function that is in the con
text considered private. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (find
ing that a public defender was not a state actor when she was representing a criminal
defendant, even though she was considered a state actor when performing other duties,
such as when making hiring decisions).
16. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (finding no state action when
nursing home administrators, using independent medical judgment, decided to dis
charge or transfer patients without adequate procedures, even though the nursing home
received substantial federal funding and was extensively regulated); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (finding no state action when a private school, acting
independently, decided to discharge employees, even though the school received almost
all of its funds from the state).
17. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-22 (1991).
18. Id. at 620; accord Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
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right, privilege, or regulation, that caused the deprivation of a con
stitutional right.19 Thus, someone must have used the state-created
means to deprive someone of his or her constitutional rights.
Second, a court must also ask "whether the private party
charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a
state actor."20 In other words, a court must determine whether the
private person who used the state-created means to deprive another
of his constitutional right is, for all intents and purposes, a state
actor; that is, whether a court ought to treat such private conduct as
if it were state conduct. 21 To make that determination, the Supreme
Court has outlined three factors: "[1] the extent to which the [pri
vate] actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; [2]
whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental func
tion; and [3] whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique
way by the incidents of governmental authority."22
Courts have referred to the first and the third of these factors
together as the "nexus" test,23 and the second factor as the "public
function" test.24 The public function test is an independent test
which analyzes whether the private action is of the kind tradition
19. For example, where a state statute provides a right to garnish, or to obtain a
prejudgment attachment, it provides the means for which a private party may deprive
another of his or her constitutional right of due process pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
20. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620; accord Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42.
21. See NAHMOD, supra note 15, § 2.04, at 62.
22. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22 (citations omitted).
23. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
24. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,475 (1953); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 3, § 12.1, at 473; GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITU·
TIONAL LAW 890-91 (13th ed. 1997); Krotoszynski, supra note 13, at 314.
Besides the "public function" and the "nexus" tests, the Supreme Court has articu
lated other tests or factors. For example, the Court has formulated the "state compul- .
sion" test, which analyzes whether a state law compelled a private person to violate
another's constitutional right, and the "joint action" test, which analyzes whether a state
official helped a private person violate another's constitutional right. See Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 170 (1970) (finding state action when a restaurant
used a state-enforced custom requiring racial segregation to deny service to a caucasian
in the company of African Americans); see also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 157 (1978) (finding no state action where private defendant engaged in true self
help when he sold a debtor's goods in his possession). For purposes of this Note, the
state compulsion test and the joint action test are grouped with the nexus test, since
they involve determining the number and quality of contacts between the private party
and the state. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 922, 939 (noting that "[w]hether these different
tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the
necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be
resolved here"). See infra Part 1.A.1 for further discussion of the various tests or
factors.
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ally exclusively reserved for the state. 25 For example, in Marsh v.
Alabama,26 the Supreme Court held that the Town of Chickasaw, a
suburb of Mobile, Alabama and privately owned by the Gulf Ship
building Corporation, which banned the distribution of religious
literature, was a state actor because running a town is a power tra
ditionally exclusively reserved to the state. 27
If a private entity fails to satisfy the public function test, a court
may still find state action if a sufficient nexus exists between the
private actor and the state. The next section examines how a court
may search for a nexus between private conduct and the state. 28
1. The Nexus Test
The nexus test is a more difficult test to apply than the public
function test. It requires a court to examine whether "private con
duct abridging individual rights" has involved "to some significant
extent the State in any of its manifestations."29 In other words, a
court must determine whether the state was somehow connected to,
25. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966), where the Supreme Court
found state action by private trustees of a park in light of the tradition of municipal
control. The Court noted the following: "[W]hen private individuals or groups are en
dowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become
agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations."

Id.
26. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
27. See id. at 508 (concluding that "the town of Chickasaw does not function dif
ferently from any other town"). Marsh applies when privately owned property is the
functional equivalent to a municipality. See Galloway, supra note 3, at 943 n.28. Cur
rently, the Court has recognized two other types of conduct as constituting a traditional
public function: running elections for public office, see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
663 (1944) (holding that a state party convention may not ban black persons from vot
ing in primary elections); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,472 (1953) (finding that a Dem
ocratic party "club" was a state actor designed to evade constitutional prohibition
against all-white primaries), and using peremptory challenges in selecting a jury, see
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627 (1991) (finding that a private
litigant's race-based exercise of peremptory challenges was state action, since alleged
deprivation implicated a traditional function of the government). But see Jackson, 419
U.S. at 352 (running a public power company was not a traditional public function ex
clusively reserved for the state); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,520 (1976) (holding
that operating privately-owned shopping centers does not constitute a "public function"
under the state action doctrine). See generally, TRIBE, supra note 3, § 18-5; NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.2.
28. For a thorough discussion of the public function test, see Esper, supra note 13,
at 687-708. Since the state action analysis in Yeo does not involve a public function test,
but the nexus test, see infra Part II, the following background material focuses on the
nexus test only.
29. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); see also
Buchanan, supra note 13, at 422.
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or had sufficient contacts with, the harm that the private actor
caused the claimant. The Supreme Court has held that this analysis
involves a fact bound inquiry and must be conducted on a case by
case basis.30 Nonetheless, the Court has used a variety of factors to
determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the private
person's conduct and the state.31

a.

Compelling, encouraging, and assisting

To determine whether a nexus exits between private and state
action, the Court has analyzed whether the state has by law, by reg
ulation, or by participation, compelled, encouraged, or assisted the
challenged private activity.32 For example, in Shelly v. Kraemer,33
the Court found state action in a white private property owner's
decision not to sell his land to an African-American purchaser be
cause a court enforced a common law restrictive covenant on the
land that forbade such sales. 34 The Court has also found state ac
30. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 722 ("Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (ac
knowledging that no bright line rule exists to determine when there are sufficient con
nections between the state and a private actor to constitute state action).
31. See generally TRIBE, supra note 3, § 18-7; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3,
§ 12.

32. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (noting that "a State
normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coer
cive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State"); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (noting that "[o]ur cases state 'that a State is responsible for
the ... act of a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act'" (altera
tion in original»; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982) (finding
that no state action existed when a private, extensively regulated, and state funded
school discharged employees because the state regulations in no way compelled or in
fluenced the school's decision); Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177
(1972) (finding no state action with a private social club's racially restrictive policies
because there was no government encouragement to have these policies).
33. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
34. See id. at 19. In Shelly, the court action began when third parties interested in
the transaction sued the owner to stop the sale. The Supreme Court held that such
private discrimination was state action since it flowed from a judicial command to en
force racial discrimination, which would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
This type of judicial encouragement of racial discrimination was also found to be state
action when the Court struck down state imposed monetary damages against those who
breached racially restrictive covenants because the penalty was the functional
equivalent to encouragement. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 250 (1953); see
also Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1964) (holding that a private restau
rant's racially restrictive practices constituted state action when those practices flowed
from state regulation that required separate toilet facilities for blacks and whites).
However, those uses of a court which implicate state action should be distinguished
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tion where a private creditor used a court to authorize, and a sheriff
to assist, the seizing of a debtor's property.35 Thus, the Court will
find a sufficient nexus when the state compels, encourages, or as
sists private persons' activities.

b.

Other contacts: regulating, benefitting, and subsidizing

The Court has also examined the number and quality of pre
sumably "neutral" contacts between the private actor and the state
for finding a sufficient nexus. These contacts include extensive li
censing and regulation of a person's activities,36 a mutual or symbi
otic relationship between the state and the private person,37 and
extensive or direct state subsidies to the private person or entity.38
Although state regulation and licensing of a private activity
from those which do not, such as using the courts to enforce trespass laws when a pri
vate landowner refuses to permit a member of a racial minority on his land. The tres
pass instances are presumably different because a court will not be involved in the
private individual's decision. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.1, at 487; see
also TRIBE, supra note 3, § 18-6, at 1711 (discussing common law as a subject of state
action theory). But see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMYTING OF AMERICA: THE POLIT
ICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 151-53 (1990) (arguing that the Shelly Court went beyond
its role as adjudicator of private agreements in finding that a "decision of a state court
under common law rules constitutes the action of the state").
35. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42 (finding state action when an oil company sued
an alleged debtor and obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment of the debtor's prop
erty and then had the county sheriff execute the writ); see also Soldal v. Cook County,
Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 72 (1992) (finding state action when the owner of a mobile home park
enlisted the assistance of the county sheriff's office to remove a mobile home from the
park by removing it from its foundation and towing it away). But see Flagg Bros., 436
U.S. at 166 (finding no state action because the creditor engaged in true self-help when
he sold a debtor's property, which was subject to a lien by the creditor).
36. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839-43 (examining whether a private school's
extensive regulations transforms it into a state actor with respect to employee dis
charges); Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003-12 (examining whether state regulations and licensing
of a private nursing home makes it a state actor when it discharged or transferred pa
tients without adequate procedures); Moose Lodge Number 107, 407 U.S. at 175-79
(examining whether a private club's liquor license makes it a state actor with respect to
the club's racial policies); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973)
(examining whether federal regulations and licensing procedures played a role in en
couraging a radio station's refusal to accept editorial advertising).
37. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1961) (finding
state action when a private coffee shop would not serve an African-American since the
shop leased its premises from a government-owned parking garage and each benefitted
from the relationship, namely, the coffee shop received extra customers because the
government employees used the garage, and the government received rental money
from the shop). See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Burton.
38. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 417 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1974) (hold
ing that a city could not grant the exclusive use of public facilities to racially segregated
groups because that constituted a subsidy to a racially discriminatory practice).
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carry weight in the state action analysis, the weight is reduced when
the effect of the regulation or license is neutral and does not some
how encourage the challenged activity.39 In other words, regulation
and licensing that does not, by itself, encourage or compel the chal
lenged activity is insufficient to find state action.40
However, finding what the Court has termed a "symbiotic" or
"mutual relationship" between the state and the private actor
weighs more heavily in a state action analysis. 41 For example, in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,42 the Court held that a
privately owned coffee shop, which leased its space from a govern
ment parking facility, was a state actor when it denied service to an
African-American customer. The Court based its holding, in part,
on the fact "that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the
parking facility in which it is located confers on each an incidental
variety of mutual benefits."43 Importantly, the Court found state
action even though the state did not directly aid or encourage the
private actor.44
Another contributing factor in finding state action under the
nexus test is the private party's use of direct or special state subsi
dies. 4s The subsidies, however, must be something more than gen
eralized services or aid, such as fire and police protection or general
tax exemptions. 46 But the amount of the subsidy is not disposi
39. See supra note 36 for examples of cases where no state action was found
involving neutral regulations.
40. See Moose Lodge Number 107, 407 U.S. at 163, 176-77, 179; see also NOWAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.4, at 495.
41. Justice Rehnquist first used the term "symbiotic relationship" in his opinion
in Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972), to refer to what he
thought was an important element in finding state action in Burton v. Wilmington Park·
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
42. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of Burton.
43. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724. The Court recognized that the restaurant benefitted
from the convenience of the parking for its guests and the business from government
workers. See id. Additionally, the government benefitted from the rental income, from
its employees enjoying the convenience of a nearby restaurant, and from the increased
demand for its parking facility. See id.
44. See id. at 725. In fact, the Court noted that it was the state's "inaction" that
"has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service [to blacks], but has elected to
place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." Id.
45. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 417 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1974). See
infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gilmore.
46. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,465 (1973) (noting that while a direct
state subsidy of textbooks to private schools that discriminate on the basis of race con
stitutes state action, other assistance not readily available independently of the state,
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tive. 47 The subsidies must be specialized and directed to a limited
group. For example, in the case of Gilmore v. City of Montgom
ery,48 the Supreme Court held that a city cannot give a racially seg
regated private school exclusive use of public facilities, since that
action would be a direct subsidy of a discriminatory practice. 49
However, the Court ostensibly acknowledged that these private
schools may use the facilities if other groups were also permitted to
use the facilities. 50 Although the Court has not directly addressed
whether receiving direct aid would, itself, tum private conduct into
state action, the result in Gilmore suggests this possibility. 51 Never
theless, the Court would probably not find state action where the
aid was generalized and indirect. 52
2. The Totality Approach
The Supreme Court has treated the relationship between nexus
factors differently over the years. 53 For example, it has held that to
find state action a court should consider the nexus factors in the
aggregate. 54 As such, the Court has, in addressing state action, ana
such as electricity, water, and police and fire protection, would not constitute state ac
tion); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.4, at 502.
47. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (finding no state action
even though in some years the state subsidized ninety-nine percent of a private school's
tuition); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982) (finding no state action even
though a private nursing home received extensive government subsidies through the
Medicare and Medicaid programs).
48. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
49. See id. at 568-69. In Gilmore, the City of Montgomery, Alabama was permit
ting racially segregated schools and other segregated private groups and clubs exclusive
use of city parks and recreational facilities in the context of a 1959 parks desegregation
order. This policy created, "in effect, 'enclaves of segregation' and deprived petitioners
of equal access to parks and recreational facilities." Id. at 566; cf. Norwood, 413 U.S. at
455 (striking down a program under which Mississippi loaned books to private schools
which discriminated on the basis of race). According to the Court in Norwood, "the
economic consequence is to give aid to the enterprise; if the school engages in discrimi
natory practices the State by tangible aid in the form of textbooks thereby gives support
to such discrimination." Id. at 464-65.
50. See Gilmore, 417 U.S. at 570 & n.lO ("[W]e are unable to draw a conclusion
as to whether the use of [public facilities] ... by private school groups in common with
others ... involves government so directly in the actions of those users as to warrant
court intervention on constitutional grounds.").
51. Cf. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1974)
(finding state action in a sex discrimination case where a little league organization de
pended heavily upon city baseball diamonds). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 3, § 12.4, at 502-03; Buchanan, supra note 13, at 401 n.444.
52. See Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465.
53. See Buchanan, supra note 13, at 390-410.
54. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961). See infra
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lyzed the combined effect of these factors. This so-called "totality
approach" "seeks to determine how far the combined force of rele
vant contact factors has .moved along the state nexus continuum."55
To determine state action, in other words, the Court will consider
the combined weight of all the nexus factors, when none alone is
sufficient, and ask whether, in the aggregate, a sufficient nexus ex
ists between the private actor and the state.
This totality approach was exemplified in the case of Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority.56 In Burton, the Eagle Coffee
Shoppe, a privately owned restaurant, refused to serve a customer
solely because he was African-American. 57 The coffee shop was lo
cated within an off-street automobile parking garage owned and op
erated by the Wilmington, Delaware Parking Authority
{"Authority").58 The owner of the coffee shop leased the space
from the Authority.59 In reversing the Delaware Supreme Court,
which had found no state action by focusing only on one factor
the rental money the shop paid to the Authority-the United States
Supreme Court found that the case turned on the consideration of a
variety of factors. 6o Importantly, none of these "other factors" in
isolation was sufficient to find state action. Instead, the Court con
sidered their combined weight to find that the state "ha[d] elected
to place its power, property and prestige behind the [challenged
conduct]."61
notes 56-60 and accompanying text for further explanation of the totality approach of
Burton. See also Buchanan, supra note 13, at 396; Phillips, supra note 13, at 697.
55. Buchanan, supra note 13, at 397; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,
50 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991); Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
56. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
57. See id. at 716.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. The Court stated that the Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion was incor
rect "when evaluated in the context of other factors which must be acknowledged." Id.
at 723. The other factors cited by the United States Supreme Court included: (1) the
government owned the land and the building and leased it to the coffee shop; (2) the
property leased to the shop and other lessees "[was] not surplus state property, but
constituted a physically and financial integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the
State's plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit[;]" (3) "the peculiar relation
ship of the restaurant to the parking facility in which it is located confers on each an
incidental variety of mutual benefits;" and (4) the restaurant where the discrimination
occurred is located in a government owned and operated building. Id. at 723-24.
61. Id. at 725. In Justice Clark's words:
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of the Author
ity, the benefits mutually conferred, together with the obvious fact that the
restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a
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The Sequential Approach

After Burton, however, the Court slowly shifted to a "sequen
tial approach" for its state action analysis. 62 With the sequential
approach, the Court considered "each state nexus factor ... in iso
lation and then discarded [it] completely if, by itself, it lack[ed] suf
ficient force to convert private action into state action."63 This
approach focuses only on those factors that alone would be suffi
cient to find state action, and it does not consider whether the fac
tor might contribute in the aggregate to a finding of state action. 64
public parking service, indicates that degree of state participation and involve
ment [necessary to create state action].
Id. at 724 (emphasis added); see also Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F.
Supp. 473, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (using Burton's totality approach to find state action in a
private university's employment termination decisions, which plaintiffs alleged violated
their First Amendment rights); Phillips, supra note 13, at 697 (noting that Burton's con
clusions implied that the nexus factors "should be assessed in their cumulative impact,
and not as discrete factors one or more of which must itself support a state action find
ing"); Buchanan, supra note 13, at 39l.
62. See Buchanan, supra note 13, at 401. According to Buchanan, the shift be
came "evident" with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), which
found no state action after analyzing, and dismissing as insufficient, each nexus factor
one at a time, but not considering them all told. See Buchanan, supra note 13, at 401
02; see also Phillips, supra note 13, at 704, 716. For example, in his dissent in Jackson,
Justice Douglas stated the following: "It is not enough to examine seriatim each of the
factors upon which a claimant relies and to dismiss each individually as being insuffi
cient to support a finding of state action. It is the aggregate that is controlling." Jackson,
419 U.S. at 362-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Marshall also
commented about this retreat when he concluded that "[t]aking these factors together, I
have no difficulty finding state action in this case." Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The reason for the Supreme Court moving away from Burton is, in part, because it
is distinguishable as a race discrimination case, where Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), were procedural due process
claims. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 251-52 (1985). See infra
Part LA.5 for further discussion of how the court may be varying its state action analy
sis according to the constitutional right at stake.
63. Buchanan, supra note 13, at 402.
64. The shift to the sequential approach went into full swing with Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (finding no state action when a private school dis
charged teachers even though the school received over ninety percent of its funding
from the state), and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (finding no state action
when a nursing home discharged or transferred patients even though the state funded
and regulated it). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in dissenting in these cases,
objecting to the courts shift from Burton's totality approach. See Rendell-Baker, 457
U.S. at 851-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Even though there are myriad indicia of state
action in this case, the majority refuses to find that the school acted under color of state
law when it discharged petitioners. The decision in this case marks a return to empty
formalism in state action doctrine." (emphasis added»; see also Phillips, supra note 13,
at 719 (noting that "[t]he cumulative approach to indicia of state action recommended
by Burton, while not officially disavowed, has been tacitly replaced by a sequential
treatment of such factors" (emphasis added»; Buchanan, supra note 13, at 404-06.
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A Partial Return to the Totality Approach

Recently, the Supreme Court has partly revived the totality ap
proach for its nexus analysis.65 The Court has been willing to con
sider the combined weight of all the nexus factors, even if one alone
is insufficient by itself to constitute state action. 66 For example, in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ,67 a civil action where the
plaintiff objected to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges,
and Georgia v. McCollum,68 a criminal action where the prosecu
tion objected to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges, the
. Court found state action where the use of these peremptory chal
lenges excluded jurors on the basis of their race. In Edmonson, the
Court's state action analysis included, in part, a nexus test which
described in detail the "overt, significant participation of ... gov
ernment [in] the peremptory challenge system."69 It concluded that
"a private party could not exercise its peremptory challenges absent
the overt, significant assistance of the court."70 Importantly, the
Supreme Court cited Burton in stressing that the court "ha[ d] not
only made itself a party to the [racial act], but ha[d] elected to place
its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimina
tion."71 In essence, then, the government was responsible for the
65. See Buchanan, supra note 13, at 420-23 (arguing that Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), and
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), "display a returning willingness by the Court
to consider the combined weight of all state contact"); see also Krotoszynski, supra note
13, at 304-05, 322-35 (arguing that recent decisions of lower federal courts were
"fail[ing) ... to honor the Supreme Court's admonition that its various verbal formula
tions of state action are but 'different ways of characterizing [a) necessarily fact-bound
inquiry.'" (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982»).
66. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622-25.
67. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
68. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
69. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 624.
71. Id. The Court also employed this analysis in McCollum. In McCollum, the
Court noted that a white criminal defendant, who used peremptory challenges in a ra
cially discriminatory way, "relie[d) on 'governmental assistance and benefits' that are
equivalent to those found in the civil context in Edmonson. 'By enforcing discrimina
tory peremptory challenge, the Court "has ... elected to place its power, property and
prestige behind the [alleged) discrimination."'" McCollum, 505 U.S. at 52 (citing Ed
monson, 500 U.S. at 624). For a critical comment on the Court's reasoning in McCol
lum, see Susan M. Sabers, The Absence of State Action in Georgia v. McCollum, 39 S.D.
L. REV. 159 (1994). For a recent application of the totality approach in the Ninth Cir
cuit, see Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998). In Grijalva, the court
found state action when a health maintenance organization denied services to Medicare
beneficiaries without adequate notice. See id. Importantly, the court used the totality
approach in its application of the Supreme Court's nexus analysis. For example, after
considering numerous nexus factors individually, the court held that "ea~h of these
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discriminatory act because it had created a framework within which
a private person could discriminate.72
5.

Variable State Action Approach

The Supreme Court has applied the totality approach, which is
an easier state action standard to overcome than the sequential ap
proach, primarily in race discrimination cases,73 while it has applied
the sequential approach primarily in due process cases.74 As such,
some commentators suggest that the Court is tacitly varying the
state action standard according to the importance of the constitu
tional violation alleged. 75
Even though the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the
relationship between state action analysis and the nature of the al
leged constitutional violation,76 numerous lower federal courts have
[nexus] factors alone might not be sufficient to establish federal action. Together they
show federal action." Id. (emphasis added); see also Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113,
117-20 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying similar analysis in Medicaid context); J.K. v. Dillenberg,
836 F. Supp. 694, 697-99 (D. Ariz. 1993) (applying similar analysis in Medicaid context).
72. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624.
73. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Con
crete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wil
mington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). But cf. Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
74. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
75. See Phillips, supra note 13, at 738 ("The Supreme Court may not have openly
considered such matters, but there is reason to believe that the 'hierarchy of constitu
tional values' approach has influenced the Court's state action decisions."); see also
TRIBE, supra note 13, § 18-3, at 1699 ("The state action requirement fixes a frame of
reference. The substantive constitutional right at issue initially determines the parame
ters of this frame."); Nat Stem, State Action, Establishment Clause, and Defamation:
Blueprints for Civil Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 57 U. ClN. L. REv. 1175, 1216
(1989) ("It seems obvious that the Court tacitly engages in 'differential state action
analysis,' under which the Court's willingness to find state action correlates to the im
portance that it attaches to the constitutional value at stake."); Morgan W.Tovey, Dial
A-Porn and the First Amendment: The State Action Loophole, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 267,
285 (1988) ("[W]hether the Court finds state action often appears to be dependent
upon the underlying constitutional right at stake.").
76. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
"[t]he Court has not adopted the notion ... that different standards should apply to
state action analysis when different constitutional claims are presented"). The Supreme
Court recently had the opportunity to address the variable approach to state action, but
declined the offer. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 408
(1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Lebron, the Court reversed the Second Circuit's
holding that no state action existed when Amtrak refused an artist's advertisement be
cause of its political content. See id. at 375. Importantly, the Second Circuit's refusal to
find state action was based on a variable state action approach since it acknowledged
that the outcome would have been different if the refusal had been based on race. See
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applied varying standards of state action analysis depending on the
type of constitutional right at stake. 77 Labeled "differential state
action analysis,"78 these courts have created a hierarchy of state ac
tion standards keyed to different substantive rights. 79 Generally,
the courts have applied the liberal state action standards to race
discrimination cases and the stricter standards to procedural due
process cases, with gender discrimination and free speech falling
somewhere in the middle. 80
Some courts have suggested that the rationale for this ap
proach is grounded in the roots of the state action doctrine itself.
Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 392 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513
U.S. 374 (1995). The Supreme Court's reversal did not address this variable state action
approach in its holding, but instead focused on whether Amtrak was a private or public
entity. Finding Amtrak to be a governmental entity, the Court avoided the variable
state action question. See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 408 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. The most prominent of these lower federal courts is the Second Circuit, which
has explicitly keyed its state action standard to the type of constitutional claim ad
vanced. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 405-08 (2d Cir. 1975) (suggesting
that state action would be found more readily in cases of racial and perhaps gender
discrimination than in First Amendment cases); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d
1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring) ("[R]acial discrimination is so pecu
liarly offensive and was so much the prime target of the Fourteenth Amendment that a
lesser degree of involvement may constitute 'state action' with respect to it than would
be required in other contexts ...."); see also Taylor v. Consolidated Edison, Co., 552
F.2d 39, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a lesser amount of government involvement
is needed to find state action in a racial discrimination case than in due process and
First Amendment cases; a lesser amount of government involvement is needed in sexual
discrimination cases as well). For an extensive list of cases in the Second Circuit, as well
as other circuits, that discuss the relationship between the constitutional rights alleged
and the state action requirement, see Jody Young Jakosa, Parsing Public from Private:
The Failure of Differential State Action Analysis, 19 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 193, 195
n.8 & n.lO (1984). In addition, see Martin B. Margulies, 1994: The First Amendment in
the Second Circuit and District of Connecticut, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 565, 567-69
(1994) (discussing, in part, the history of the Second Circuit's variable state action
approach).
78. For purposes of this Note, "differential state action analysis" is referred to as
"variable" state action analysis because the term more clearly expresses the idea that
state action should vary with the constitutional right at stake.
79. See Jakosa, supra note 77, at 206.
80. See Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1974) (recognizing "a
less onerous [state action] test for cases involving racial discrimination, and a more
rigorous standard for other claims"); Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 394 F. Supp.
138,144 n.7 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that race discrimination state action precedents not
applicable to gender discrimination), affd, 527 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also
Jakosa, supra note 77, at 199-202 (noting that most courts have been reluctant to re
solve the issue of whether the liberal state action standard for race discrimination cases
should also apply to gender discrimination cases, thus leaving gender cases somewhere
in the middle); id. at 202 n.38 (citations therein). But cf. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d
1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the less onerous totality approach in the context of a due
process violation).
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The state action doctrine originated in the Civil Rights Cases ,81
when race discrimination was an invidious wrong that the recon
struction amendments, especially the Fourteenth Amendment,
aimed to eradicate. 82 This level of concern over race discrimination
is evidenced in the Supreme Court's use of strict scrutiny review
when it analyzes the merits of race discrimination cases, while using
intermediate review to evaluate cases of gender discrimination and
only minimal scrutiny in cases involving nonfundamental rights. 83
Whatever the rationale, however, lower courts have suggested that
less state involvement needs to be found with constitutional viola
tions that courts take more seriously on the merits, hence creating a
hierarchy of constitutional rights keyed to different standards of
state action.
B.

State Action in the Public High School Context

On several occasions the Supreme Court has been called upon
to apply state action analysis in the context of public schools. In
each of these cases, state action was presumed or conceded where
students claimed that public school administrators violated their
First Amendment rights, as these administrators were deemed state
officials. 84 United States courts of appeals have also found state
81. 109 u.s. 3 (1883).
82. See NAACP v. Thompson, 648 F. Supp. 195, 244 (D. Md. 1986) (noting that
"the level of state action may be de minimis when racial discrimination is alleged be
cause the hallmark of the Fourteenth Amendment has been to safeguard against dis
crimination based on race"); see also Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1117
(9th Cir. 1975) (Ely, J., concurring and dissenting in part); Coleman v. Wagner College,
429 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring); Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1968); New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees,
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 481,488 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975); Oller v.
Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.
Supp. 1382, 1392-93 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966
Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARv. L. REv. 69, 82 (1967).
83. Under the strict scrutiny test, the alleged constitutional violation will be held
invalid unless it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). Under the minimal scrutiny test, an alleged constitu
tional violation will be presumed valid if it bears a rational relationship to the end
sought. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979). Under
the intermediate scrutiny test, an alleged constitutional violation will be held invalid
unless it bears a substantial relationship to an important government interest. See Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
84. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (presuming
state action when students filed a First Amendment complaint against their high school
principal's act of deleting student articles from the high school paper); Bethel Sch. Dist.
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (presuming state action when school officials disciplined a
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action where public school officials acted together with, or en
couraged, students to produce the challenged constitutional
violation. 85
However, courts have not yet addressed the state action issue
in a scenario where public high school students, acting indepen
dently, allegedly infringe upon another's constitutional rights. 86 In
such a case a court would apply the nexus test by analyzing the
following questions. Had the school, by law, by regulation, or by
participation, compelled, encouraged, or assisted the high school
student newspaper editors' actions? Or, do the student editors' ac
tions have sufficient contact with the school officials vis-a-vis school
regulations, mutual benefits (a symbiotic relationship), or direct
funding?87 This novel scenario was presented, and these questions
were raised, in the case of Yeo v. Town of Lexington. 88
II.

YEO V. TOWN OF LEXINGTON

This section will discuss the case of Yeo v. Town of Lexington
in detail. After presenting the facts of the case, it will discuss the
opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Mas
sachusetts. It will then discuss the state action arguments of the
majority and dissenting opinions of the three judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Finally, the
section will discuss the majority and concurring opinions in the First
student for inappropriate language at a school assembly); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (presuming state action when striking down
school officials' regulation against wearing anti-Vietnam arm bands); see also Vernonia
Sch. Dist. v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (presuming state action when student filed a
Fourth Amendment claim against school district).
85. See Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Bd., 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding state action when high school students' decision to reject ads from
outside vendor was in compliance with school board policy); San Diego Comm. Against
Registration and the Draft v. Governing Bd. of the Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist.,
790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding state action when high school students' decision
to reject an ad from an outside political group was directed by the school board).
86. College student-run newspapers are the closest analogue, and in these cases
courts have been reluctant to find state action. See, e.g., Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53
55 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding no state action where student editors of law school journal
rejected ad); Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no state
action in refusal to print an ad where the student paper "maintains its editorial freedom
from the state"); Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir.
1976) (finding no state action when editors of college student newspaper refused to run
ad); Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1967) (presuming no state action
where state-supported law review rejected an article since editorial discretion is an es
sential element of publishing a journal).
87. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the nexus test and its sub-factors.
88. 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
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Circuit's en banc decision, which reversed the three judge panel and
affirmed the district court's decision that no state action existed.
A.

Case Facts

In 1992, the Lexington School Committee decided "to dis
tribute condoms and information regarding sexually transmitted
diseases to students without parental consent."89 Douglas Yeo, a
town resident and parent, opposed the decision and formed a polit
ical action group that successfully placed the issue on the 1993
Town Ballot in the form of a town-wide referendum on the School
Committee's condom policy.90 The town sided with the School
Committee; the voters approved the condom policy.91 In response,
Yeo helped establish the Lexington Parents Information Network
("LEXNET") "to educate parents on public school issues."92 On
behalf of LEXNET, Yeo submitted an advertisement promoting ab
stinence to the Lexington High School ("LHS") Yearbook. 93
The LHS Yearbook was run by students. A staff of about sixty
students made all editorial, business, and staffing decisions. 94 A
LHS teacher advised the students, and the school paid her a stipend
of less than $2,000 for that job. 95 This stipend and the use of LHS
buildings and facilities were the only support the Yearbook re
ceived from the schoo1. 96 Money from the sales of advertising and
books entirely funded the Yearbook, allowing it to be financially
independent from the schoo1. 97
The co-editors of the Yearbook rejected Yeo's ad and in
structed their faculty advisor to call Yeo and offer him a chance to
rewrite the ad "in a tone more appropriate to the mission of the
Yearbook."98 Yeo rejected the offer, and the faculty advisor subse
quently sent Yeo a letter reaffirming the students' decision. 99 Yeo
89. Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94-10811-RGS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at
*7 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996), affd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. [d. at *9.
93. See id. See supra note 5 for the text of the ad.
94. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 243 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Yeo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *10.
99. See id. at *11. Karen Mechem, a LHS reading teacher and the Yearbook
faculty advisor since 1980, stated that "because of the non-controversial nature of the
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responded, by demanding that the Yearbook reconsider its deci
sion. lOO The Yearbook editors subsequently reaffirmed their deci
sion to reject the ad, which the faculty advisor communicated to
Yeo.1° l
Yeo also submitted a similar advertisement to the LHS news
paper, the Musket. 102 Like the Yearbook, the Musket was student
written and edited, with the students making all editorial, opera
tional, and staffing decisions.103 Its faculty advisor received $1,373
for that activity, and the School Committee provided funding of
$4,500 per year. 104 The only LHS property that the Musket used
was a mailbox; moreover, all the editorial layouts were done at the
editors' homes. lo5
After receiving the advertisement request, the newspaper's
business editor wrote to Yeo on behalf of the Musket informing him
that the newspaper had rejected the ad.106 Yeo protested to school
officials, who advised the students that they should print the ad. lo7
Nonetheless, the student editors reiterated their decision not to
publish the ad. lo8
B.

The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts
Yeo filed a complaint in the United States District Court for

advertising section of the yearbook, we have decided not to print [the] advertising you
have submitted." Id. The panel decision had used Ms. Mechem's use of "we" as evi
dence of the school's involvement in the decision to reject the ad, but later the panel's
author, Judge Stahl, was convinced that it did not implicate the school. See Yeo, 131
F.3d at 257 (Stahl, J., concurring).
100. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 245.
101. See id.
102. See id. The advertisement sent to the newspaper had an additional line in
structing students to contact LEXNET. See id.
103. See id. at 243-44.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 244.
106. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94-10811-RGS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7310, at *11 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996), affd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), eert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
107. See id. at *12-13. The superintendent, Jeffrey Young, wanted the ads printed
"because the Town Counsel had determined that they should be published." Id. at *13.
David Wilson, the school principal, even assured Yeo that the ads would be published
and accepted from Yeo the uncashed $200 check for payment that the Yearbook had
returned to him. See id.
108. See id. at *14. The students' decision occurred at a final meeting between
the student editors of both the Musket and the Yearbook, the faculty advisors of each
publication, the LHS Vice Principal (sitting in for the Principal), the Superintendent,
and two members of the school board. See id.
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the District of Massachusetts claiming that the Town of Lexington,
among others,109 violated his right to free speech guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu
tion and by Article XVI of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. 110 The defendants moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that "any alleged violation of [Yeo's] right to free speech
cannot be ascribed to state action."111 Both the Yearbook and the
Musket, the defendants argued, were independently run student
publications, and as such, their editors' acts were those of private
individuals immune from constitutional challenge. 1l2
Yeo argued that the publications' decisions were state actions,
109. Among the other parties that Yeo named as defendants were David Wilson,
the principal of the Lexington High School; Jeffrey Young, the superintendent of the
Lexington Schools; Samuel Kafrissen, the teacher/advisor of the school newspaper, the
Musket; Karen Mechem, the teacher/advisor of the LHS Yearbook; and the five mem
bers of the Lexington School Committee, John Oberteuffer, Lois Coit, Joseph Dini,
Susan Elberger, and Barrie Peltz, who were individually named as defendants. See id.
at *2, *3 n.l. No student editor, however, was named as a defendant.
110. See id. at *2-3.
111. Id. at *15.
112. See id. at *16. To bolster their case, the defendants argued that the publica
tions operated independently of the school officials as required under Massachusetts
law, which forbids school officials from abridging students' right to freedom of expres
sion and as such releases school officials from any civil or criminal responsibility result
ing from that speech. See id. at *16 n.13. The law mandates in relevant part:
The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the
commonwealth shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not cause
any disruption or disorder within the school. Freedom of expression shall in
clude without limitation, the rights and responsibilities of students, collectively
and individually, (a) to express their views through speech and symbols, (b) to
write, publish and disseminate their views, (c) to assemble peaceably on school
property ....
No expression made by students in the exercise of such rights shall be
deemed to be an expression of school policy and no school officials shall be
held responsible in any civil or criminal action for any expression made or
published by the students.
For the purposes of this section and sections eighty-three to eighty-five,
inclusive, the word student shall mean any person attending a public secon
dary school in the commonwealth. The word school official shall mean any
member or employee of the local school committee.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82 (1996). Originally the statute was elective, but on July
14, 1988, "in response to the [Hazelwood] decision, [which limited high school student
free speech,] the Massachusetts legislature made the provision mandatory." J. Marc
Abrams & Mark Goodman, End of an Era? the Decline of Student Press Rights in the
Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706,730 n.172; see
also, Frank Phillips, Legislative Committee Backs Bill to Bar Censoring of School Pa
pers, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 25, 1988, at B21. Four other states responded to Hazel
wood with similar mandatory statutes. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-18-1201 to -1204
(Mitchie 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120 (West 1990); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 280.22 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1504 to -1506 (1992). California's student
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and he advanced two theories to support his position. 113 First, Yeo
argued that the court should find state action because of the close
relationship between the LHS publications and the school authori
ties. 114 For example, he argued that both publications received fi
nancial support from the school, both were regulated curricular
activities, and both enjoyed a symbiotic or mutually beneficial rela
tionship with the schooJ.115 The court disagreed, finding that
neither financial support nor regulated activity alone was sufficient
for a finding of state action.11 6 It stated that the proper test for
finding state action is whether the state meaningfully participated in
the challenged act. 117 The court added that meaningful participa
tion requires a mutually beneficial relationship (or a symbiotic rela
tionship), and that such a relationship did not exist in this case. 118
Yeo argued, in the alternative, that there was state action be
cause the school officials" 'held themselves ... out as [being] capa
ble of resolving' the conflict" and thus the court should infer that
the school officials were the real actors. 119 The court, however,
noted that there was no evidence that anyone except the students
actually made the decision to reject Yeo's adsPo At best, the court
maintained, school officials might have approved or acquiesced in
the decision, but that alone was insufficient to establish state ac
tionPl Thus, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted the defendants' motion for summary
free speech statute, CALIF. EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1983), existed prior to the Ha
zelwood decision.
113. See Yeo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *17.
114. See id. at *18-23.
115. See supra Part LA.1 for a discussion of these nexus factors for determining
state action. Yeo's state action argument was based on the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding a student-run
college newspaper's refusal to print an ad where the student paper "maintains its edito
rial freedom from the state"). The court in Sinn provided four factors for determining
state action: "(1) extensive regulation, (2) receipt of public funds, (3) type of function
involved [i.e., the public function test], and (4) presence of a symbiotic relationship."
Id. at 665; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-42 (1982) (establishing the
four factors for finding state action). Yeo argued that only the third factor did not exist.
See Yeo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *18 n.16.
116. See Yeo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *19-21.
117. See id. at *23.
118. See id.
119. Id. (quoting Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, at 31-32).
120. See id. at *24. The court noted that Yeo offered "nothing other than per
sonal conjecture to dispute the student editors' sworn affidavits that they made the
decision to reject Yeo's advertisement." Id.
121. See id. at *26 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982)).
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judgment. 122
C.

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Panel
Decision

Yeo appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and a panel of the First Cir
cuit reversed the district court's ruling. 123 The First Circuit panel
held that the defendant, Lexington High School, did engage in state
action when it denied Douglas Yeo access to advertisement space in
the Musket and the Yearbook.1 24 This section will discuss the rea
soning of the majority and dissent with respect to the state action
issue.
1.

The Majority Opinion

Under the facts of Yeo, the majority, in an opinion written by
Judge Stahl, found the controlling framework for state action analy
sis established in the most recent Supreme Court case on public
high school free speech, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.125
The majority interpreted Hazelwood as providing the test for find
ing state action in this context: state action exists if it is reasonable
122. See id. at *28.
123. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *1 (1st Cir.
June 6, 1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060
(1998).
124. See id. at *4. After finding state action, the court analyzed the merits of
Yeo's First Amendment argument. The court held that the students' decision to reject
Yeo's ads violated his First Amendment right to free speech. See id. at *8-18; see also
id. at *29-35 (Lynch, J., dissenting). But since the panel's decision was vacated for lack
of state action, and the en banc court did not reach the merits of the First Amendment
issue, this Note focuses only on the state action question. For a critical discussion of the
panel's First Amendment analysis, see John Matthew Berner, Casenote and Comment,
Abstinence, Advertisements, and the Abridgment of First Amendment Student Press
Rights: Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173 (lst Cir. June 6,1997),
21 HAMLINE L. REv. 181, 211-21 (1997).
125. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *5; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that a public high school principal did not violate high
school students' First Amendment rights when he censored two articles from a high
school newspaper).
The majority in Yeo began by attacking the district court's reliance on Sinn v. Daily
Nebraskan, 829 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 1987), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,
840-42 (1982), for its holding of no state action. The First Circuit panel found these
cases distinguishable because the former involved a college newspaper at a state-sup
ported university, and the latter involved teacher diSCharges from private, special-needs
schools. The case at bar, however, involved publications at a public high school. See
Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *5.
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to perceive that the publications "bore the imprimatur(126] of the
school."127 Applying this "imprimatur test," the majority held that
state action existed since there was a reasonable perception that the
publications bore the imprimatur of the school-faculty members
supervised both publications, and both were designed to educate
and train student participants. 128 Moreover, the majority found
that the student editors were not "wholly private actors" but were
the representatives of public school publications, which bore the
imprimatur of the school and which the school distributed to the
publicJ29 As such, the court held that the Musket's and the Year
126. An "imprimatur" is Latin for "let it be printed." It is a license or an allow
ance "giving permission to print or publish a book." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756
(6th ed. 1990).
127. Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *5. The majority opinion interpreted Hazelwood to
mean that state action exists "where one confronts 'school-sponsored publications, the
atrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.'" Id.
(quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271).
In their brief for an en banc hearing, the defendants directly challenged the major
ity's interpretation of Hazelwood as containing an "imprimatur test." For example, the
defendants argued that this state action test was not found in Hazelwood; in fact, the
words "state action" do not appear in the opinion, and Hazelwood never even ad
dressed the issue of state action. State action was presumed in Hazelwood because the
students filed suit against the school principal. See En Banc Brief for Defendants-Ap
pellees at 5, Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1623).
Additionally, neither the district court nor the plaintiff considered Hazelwood as a
source for its state action analysis. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 94-10811-RGS,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7310, at *18 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 1996), affd en bane 131 F.3d 241
(1st Cir. 1997), eert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
128. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *6. In articulating additional reasons to rein
force its conclusion that the publications bore the imprimatur of the school, the court
stated the following:
First, the high school's principal controlled the bank checking accounts of both
publications. Moreover, the principal's affidavit indicates that he and other
Lexington school officials retained authority and discretion over what the
school publications would publish and that they were prepared to exercise
such authority in cases involving a student desire to publish obscenity or other
illegal material. In addition, the newspaper was largely funded with monies
from the public fisc. Finally, both publications' faculty advisors received
school salary supplements of several thousand dollars annually based on the
additional responsibilities associated with their respective positions relative to
the publications.
[d. (footnote omitted).
129. Id. at *7. The court noted that state action existed regardless of any factual
dispute over whether the students made independent or private decisions:
Our [state action] analysis would not change even if the town defendants con
vinced us that the student editors rejected the ads independently of Kafrissen,
Mechem, Wilson, Young, and the other school officials with whom they were
in close contact. ... [The] Government cannot say that its behavior cannot be
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book's refusal to publish Yeo's ads constituted state action.13°
2.

Dissenting Opinion

In dissent, Judge Lynch disagreed with the majority's state ac
tion analysis. She concluded that no state action existed because, in
both publications, the students acted as independent editors, and
their actions could not be fairly attributed to the school.1 31
Under the facts of Yeo,132 the dissent noted that two ap
proaches existed to finding state action.133 The first approach re
quired that the school administration's decision not to interfere
constitute state action. 134 The second approach required that all
the facts "taken together in context" sufficed to produce state ac
tion.13 5 Yeo, the dissent concluded, failed on both accounts.136
In addressing the issue of whether the school offiCials' decision
not to interfere should have constituted state action, the dissent
noted that the leading Supreme Court decisions were "meaningfully
different" and "thus provide[d] little guidance" for answering this
question.13 7 Specifically, the dissent noted that Hazelwood, which
the majority used to frame its analysis, involved students' claims
against public school administrators,138 while the present case, by
contrast, involved a non-student's claim against the inaction of
challenged because it was not acting independently, but rather was merely fol
lowing "private" orders.
Id. at *7 n.8. (citations omitted).
.
130. See id. at *7. The court rejected the defendant's argument that Chapter 7,
section 82(b) of the General Laws of Massachusetts precluded a finding of state action,
since state action analysis preempted it, and since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court has not addressed the issue of "the right of student-edited, school-sponsored pub
lications to reject advertisements submitted to them." Id. at *7 & n.9.
131. See id. at *29 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
132. The dissent noted that Yeo did not sue the students, but rather the public
school administrators, teachers, and members of the Lexington School Committee, who
were presumably state officials. See id. at *26 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
133. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting).
134. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). If the court believed that the school officials
had affirmatively acted in the decision to reject Yeo's ad, then there would be little need
for state action analysis because state action is presumed when a state official produces
the challenged conduct. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). Because the government chose
not to act in the present case, and the Constitution does not require or forbid them to
act, the dissent noted that the "state action analysis is thus placed squarely in a very
complex and changing area of th,e law." Id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). See supra Part I.A
for further discussion of state action analysis.
135. Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at * 26 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at *29 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at *26 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
138. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting).
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school officials. 139
To answer this state action question, the dissent utilized two
tests: the public function test and the nexus test. 140 First the dissent
asked, did the state delegate a traditional public function to a pri
vate actor?141 According to the dissent, running a school newspa
per was neither a traditional government function, nor the exclusive
prerogative of the state.1 42 Thus, according to the dissent, Yeo
could not establish state action using the public function test.
Next, the dissent applied the nexus test: was there a sufficient
connection between state regulation, financial support, and the
challenged conduct?143 Judge Lynch noted that although each pub
lication received some financial support, there was "very little inter
play between the decision here and the state. "144 The dissent found
that the financial relationship played no role in compelling, either
covertly or overtly, the students' decision to reject the ads.1 45
139. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent cited additional Supreme Court
decisions regarding high schools and students that it also considered distinguishable.
See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (students challenged school
officials' disciplinary actions); Tmker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (student challenged school officials' censorship actions); see also Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (students challenged school district's mandatory
drug testing).
The dissent further noted that "it is difficult to shoehorn the facts of this case into
the fact patterns of the modern state action cases." Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *26
(Lynch, J., dissenting). On this point the dissent queried:
Is this case like Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), where the actions
of a private school, almost entirely funded by the state and closely regulated
by public authorities, were found not to be state action? Arguably not, be
cause this case involves a public school. Is it more like Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), where a private litigant's race-based exer
cise of peremptory challenges was found to be state action? Arguably not,
because the alleged deprivation here does not implicate a traditional function
of the government. Is it more like NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988),
where an unincorporated association of public and private colleges was found
not to be a state actor even though the association's actions led a public col
lege to take disciplinary action against a basketball coach? Arguably not, be
cause in this case the state actors, the adults, have a supervisory relationship to
the private group, the students, and are thus somewhat the inverse of the
NCAA and the public college.
Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *26 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (parallel citations omitted).
140. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *26 (Lynch, J., dissenting). See supra Part I.A
for further discussion of these tests.
141. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *27 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
142. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting).
143. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Lynch, J., dissenting).
145. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that no symbiotic or
mutually beneficial relationship existed between the publications and the school. See
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The dissent next addressed whether the context in which the
students caused the alleged constitutional violation would establish
state action. Judge Lynch noted that although the students made
their decision in a public setting-as public students at a public high
school on public grounds-they had taken on private roles as stu
dent editors. 146 As such, their actions were similar to those of the
public defender in the case of Polk County v. Dodson who had
taken on a private function when she acted as counsel to her cli
ent.1 47 In Dodson, the Court held that the public defender was not
a state actor, even though she was considered a state actor when
performing other duties, such as when making hiring decisions,
since her duties to her client were akin to those of a private attor
ney.148 Likewise, the dissent in Yeo noted that the students took on
the duties of a private editor. For example, the students were in
dependent of school officials, and at times maintained an adver
sarial relationship with them. 149 Accordingly, the dissent concluded
that because the record established that the student editors made
independent editorial judgments, no state action existed. 150
D.

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, En Banc

The en banc court reversed the three judge panel and affirmed
the district court's holding that no state action existed; as a result,
the case was dismissed.1 51 Judge Lynch, writing for a unanimous
court, expanded the argument previously made in dissent.
Although no judge filed a dissenting opinion,152 Judge Stahl, who
id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that "it is difficult ... to discern what
mutual benefits might arise from the students' decision not to run Yeo's ads." Id.
(Lynch, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at *28 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
147. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). In Dodson, an
Iowa prisoner brought a pro se claim against, among others, an attorney in the Offender
Advocate's Office claiming that his civil rights were violated when the public defender
moved to withdraw as his counsel on the ground that his claims were legally frivolous.
See id. at 314. The Supreme Court held, in relevant part, that the public defender "did
not act under color of state law in exercising her independent professional judgment in
a [state] criminal proceeding." Id. at 324.
148. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 324-25.
149. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *29 (Lynch, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed
out that, in fact, the school officials would have made a different decision. See id.
(Lynch, J., dissenting).
150. See id. (Lynch, J., dissenting).
151. Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 243 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
152. Although no judge technically filed a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Tor
ruella's concurring opinion insisted that the en banc court mistakenly failed to address
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had written the panel majority opinion, wrote a concurring opinion
in which he concurred in the result, but continued to disagree with
Judge Lynch's state action analysis. Thus, in addition to summariz
ing Judge Lynch's majority opinion, the following section will ex
plain Judge Stahl's continuing disagreements with the majority
VIew.
1.

The Majority Opinion

Judge Lynch began her analysis by distinguishing the facts of
Yeo as meaningfully different than the leading Supreme Court cases
on high school student speech.153 Moreover, she noted that other
circuit courts which have addressed the closest analogues-in
dependent college studentedltors-did not find state action. 154
Thus, in framing the analysis for the novel set of facts in Yeo,
Judge Lynch approached the state action inquiry by outlining three
issues for analysis: 155 the first was whether the state, through the
school officials, was affirmatively involved, either directly or co
vertly, in rejecting Yeo's ad;156 the second was whether the school's
failure to prevent the challenged conduct constituted state action;157
and the third was whether the students' independent acts were
fairly attributable to the school officials. 15s
Regarding the first inquiry, Judge Lynch noted that whether
any direct state involvement existed was primarily a factual ques
tion, and the record did not support any direct state involvement.159
She noted that there were indirect, more subtle ways that the school
might have played a role in the decision-making process, either
through a symbiotic relationship or by taking on a traditional public
function.1 60 However, evidence of a symbiotic relationship was inthe "important issue" of "the absence of a public forum" with respect to the students'
publications. Id. (Torruella, J., concurring). Yet, for the court to have addressed that
issue, it would have first had to find state action and thereafter address the merits of
Douglas Yeo's First Amendment claim. Thus, it appears as if Judge Torruella is implic
itly dissenting from the state action issue.
153. See id. at 250. See supra note 139 for an explanation of those cases.
154. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 251. See supra note 86 for citations to these analogous
cases.
155. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 251.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 251-52.
160. See id. at 252. Judge Lynch also noted that the facts do not support the claim
that the school was the "real actor" behind the scenes, nor that it was involved in some
kind of "charade designed to evade constitutional prohibitions." Id.
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sufficient for constituting state action since "there [was] no evi
dence the school officials tacitly endorsed or benefitted from the
students' decisions."161 Moreover, publishing a student newspaper
and yearbook "is most emphatically not a traditional function nor
an exclusive prerogative of the government in this country."162
Thus, the state had neither a direct, nor a tacit affirmative involve
ment in the challenged activity.
Second, Judge Lynch considered whether the school's inaction
constituted state action. For inaction to constitute state action,
school officials must have an affirmative duty to prevent the chal
lenged conduct. 163 While recognizing that state statutes are not de
terminative of the outcome of a federal constitutional question,
Judge Lynch noted that the relevant Massachusetts statute, which
prohibits school officials from censoring students, did not require
the state to act affirmatively in instances such as the one in this
case.1 64 Thus, without an affirmative duty to act, the school's acqui
escence did not constitute state action. 165
Finally, Judge Lynch addressed what she termed the "key is
sue," namely, whether the students' independent conduct "may be
fairly attributable to the state."166 In making this determination,
she applied the nexus test factors.167 Judge Lynch first noted that
the nexus between "state regulation and financial support of the
pUblications and the challenged decisions militates against a state
action finding."168 Under the facts of Yeo, Judge Lynch found that
although each publication received some financial support, there
was "no interplay between the decision not to publish the advertise
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 253.
165. Only rarely would the state have a duty to intervene to prevent a private
actor from doing harm. For example, "state officials could not personally stand by and
watch privately-contracted-for prison guards beat a prisoner to death, and then defend
on the ground of no state action." Id. at 252 n.11; see also Ponce v. Basketball Fed'n of
Puerto Rico, 760 F.2d 375, 378-80 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that some occasions exist
where "[t]he government should be responsible for failing to act where it should act,"
but in the case at bar no state action existed because the government had no affirmative
duty to regulate amateur sports leagues); cf. DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dep't of
Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (finding that the Due Process Clause imposes no
affirmative duty on the government to protect citizens from deprivation of life, liberty,
or property by private actors).
166. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 253.
167. See id. See supra Part LA.1 for a discussion of the nexus factors.
168. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 253.
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ment and the state's provision of financial and faculty support."169
Moreover, reiterating an argument she made in her previous
panel dissent, Judge Lynch added that the state action question
"may shift depending on the context and the question asked."170
Although the students made decisions in the context of a public
school setting, in assuming their duties as editors, they had taken on
a private role much like the public defender in Polk County v. Dod
son l71 when she assumed the role of a private attorney in perform
ing her duties as counsel for her client. l72 The students' role as
independent editors, therefore, mitigated against finding state
action.
Thus, because the record established that the student editors
made independent editorial decisions, and that these decisions
could not be fairly attributed to the school, the court held that no
state action existed and dismissed Yeo's suit.173
2.

Judge Stahl's Concurrence

Judge Stahl concurred with the majority's result, but for differ
ent reasons. Judge Stahl found the majority's state action ruling "to
be wrong on the merits."174 He asserted that the students were
169. Id. at 254.
170. Id.
171. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
172. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254. In Dodson, the public defender was not a state
actor when she represented a criminal defendant since, in that context, her role (and
relationship with the state) was the same as that of any private attorney's, even though
she was considered a state actor when performing other duties, such as when making
hiring decisions. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 324-25. Judge Lynch noted the following:
Even acknowledging that the public defender is a state employee, [Dodson]
considered it important that, in the actual function of defending the client, the
public defender's relationship to the state was necessarily independent, and
even adversarial, and that the defender exercised independent judgment in the
same manner as did attorneys in the private sector. So too here.
Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254 (footnote and citations omitted).
Likewise, Judge Lynch noted that the students in the case at bar were not state
actors in their role as editors acting independently of the school, even though one could
identify other contexts where they may be state actors. See id.
173. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 255.
174. Id. at 256 (Stahl, J., concurring). Judge Stahl asserted that the case should
have been dismissed on statutory grounds because the defendants-Lexington High
School officials-did not, pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, "ultimately cause the conduct of
the non-party students," who rejected Yeo's ad. Id. (Stahl, J., concurring). See supra
note 7 for the text of 42 U.S.c. § 1983. To prove this causal element of a § 1983 claim,
the plaintiff Yeo would have had to show that either one individual defendant "actually
colluded with the students" in their decision to reject the ad, or that the ad was rejected
pursuant to the Town of Lexington's policy or custom. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 256 (Stahl, J.,
concurring). Insufficient evidence existed, noted Judge Stahl, to show either type of
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public, not private, actors "insofar as they solicited and published
advertisements from paying third partes. "175
Although Judge Stahl abandoned his use of the Hazelwood
"imprimatur test,"176 he resurrected another position he had used
in his previous majority panel opinion. 177 The student editors
should be viewed as public actors, he asserted, "when they act as
representatives of public school publications that bear the imprima
tur of the school and are disseminated to the public as suCh."178
More specifically, he noted that the students were public actors in
their role as officials of the school newspaper in soliciting funds for
it.1 79
Thus, according to Judge Stahl, the majority overlooked the
preliminary question of whether the students were private or public
actors. 180 He stated that the majority incorrectly relied on cases
that "presume[ d] that the actor [was] private. "181 These cases be
gan the state action analysis by asking whether the private actor's
action may be fairly attributable to the state instead of asking the
antecedent question of whether the person or entity is a private or
public actor. 182 As a preliminary matter, then, Judge Stahl asserted
that the state action inquiry must begin with the question of
"whether the conduct was ... public or private."183
causation. See id. (Stahl, J., concurring). As such, Stahl reasoned that the majority's
state action ruling was a violation of judicial restraint because the court inappropriately
reached a constitutional question of state action" 'in advance of the necessity of decid
ing [it].'" Id. (Stahl, J., concurring) (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes v. World Eng'g,
P.e., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)). But see id. at 249 n.3 (noting that Judge Stahl's sugges
tion is an "unusual approach" since the Supreme Court has "consistently addressed the
state action question before addressing questions of causation").
175. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 257 (Stahl, J., concurring).
176. See supra Part II.e.1 for an explanation of this argument.
177. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *7 (1st Cir.
June 6, 1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), eert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060
(1998).
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 257 (Stahl, J., concurring) (noting that "[w]hether a
person or entity is a private or a public actor obviously cannot be resolved through
application of cases which presume that the actor is private").
181. Id. (Stahl, J., concurring).
182. See id. (Stahl, J., concurring).
183. Id. (Stahl, J., concurring). As an illustration, Judge Stahl noted that if an on
duty municipal police officer misuses his power to carry out a personal vendetta, the
state action analysis would focus on whether his actions were solely private or were
made possible by virtue of power of state law and because the officer "is clothed with
the authority of state law." Id. at 258 (Stahl, J., concurring) (citing Martinez v. Colon,
54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding no state action when on-duty police officer,
assailant, at time and place in question, was engaged in clearly personal pursuit, and
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The appropriate criteria for determining whether the students
were public or private actors, Judge Stahl noted, may be found in
Polk County v. Dodson. l84 In Dodson, the Court used two criteria
to distinguish between the public defender's private and public
roles. 185 First, because of a public defender's duty of loyalty to her
client, she "is not amenable to administrative direction [from the
state] in the same sense as other employees of the State. "186 Sec
ond, because state criminal defendants have a constitutional right to
counsel, "it is the constitutional obligation of the State to respect
the professional independence of the public defenders whom it en
gages."187 Thus, a public defender's duty of loyalty and a defend
ant's right to counsel preclude the public defender from acting on
behalf of the state, or in a public capacity in her role as the criminal
defendant's counsel. In that role, therefore, she acted as a private
actor.
Applying this analytic framework to the students' activities in
working for the newspaper and yearbook, Judge Stahl concluded
that the students performed a public function "insofar as they solic
ited and published [or declined to publish] advertisements from
paying third parties."188 He reasoned that the students' commercial
function is a public role and not a private one because there is
neither a duty of loyalty to a third party that would preclude super
visory direction, nor a constitutional obligation of the state to re
spect the students' commercial judgment,189 Although the students
as editors and publishers were performing private functions, Judge
Stahl stated that "to the extent public school students solicit funds
to support a public enterprise in their capacities as officials of that
was not acting under color of state law, precluding a § 1983 substantive due process
claim)). Likewise, Judge Stahl insisted that determining whether the students are pub
lic or private actors requires criteria other than those that determine whether the stu
dents' acts may be attributed to the Town. Criteria are needed to determine whether
the students themselves are public or private actors. See id. (Stahl, J.,concurring).
184. See id. (Stahl, J., concurring). In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981), the Supreme Court used a "functional test" when it held that a public defender
does not act under color of law "when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as
counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 325. The Court found that the
public defender's function in this role was a private, not a public function, as opposed to
when she was making hiring and firing decisions on behalf of the state. See id. See
supra note 147 for the facts of Dodson.
185. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321-22.
186. Id. at 321.
187. Id. at 321-22.
188. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 257 (Stahl, J., concurring).
189. See id. at 258 (Stahl, J., concurring).
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enterprise, they act under color of State law."190 Thus, Judge Stahl
utilized Dodson's functional analysis against the reasoning of the
majority by asserting that although the students did perform private
functions, they performed a public one as well, and that should
have been sufficient for finding state action. 191
III.

EQUAL CONSIDERATION FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

In Yeo v. Town of Lexington, the United States Court of Ap
peals for the First Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the students'
decision to reject the ad was not state action. since there was an
insufficient nexus between the school and the students' decision. 192
Yet, the court noted that under the same set of facts, state action
would have been found if the students' decision had been to ex
clude someone from their editorial board on account of race. 193
The First Circuit would have ruled differently in a race discrimina
tion case because in Yeo it endorsed the variable state action analy
SiS,194 applying a heightened state action standard to an alleged
First Amendment violation and a more liberal standard to an al
leged race discrimination violation.
This Part of the Note will critically analyze the court's use of
this variable state action analysis in Yeo v. Town of Lexington.
First, it will demonstrate how the majority applied the sequential
approach's heightened standard in its state action analysis of the
alleged First Amendment violation.195 Second, this Part examines
I·

190. Id. at 259 (Stahl, J., concurring). In fact, Judge Stahl stated that "the power
of school officials to regulate the content of student publications and the acts of their
student editors ... is near its apex where the subject of the regulation involves the
students' commercial interactions with third parties." Id. at 258. (Stahl, J., concurring)
(citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 u.S. 260, 266-70 (1988».
191. See id. (Stahl, J., concurring). The majority dismissed, out of hand, Judge
Stahl's argument for distinguishing the students as acting privately in their role of re
porting and publicly in their role of making advertisement decisions. See id. at 250 n.7.
192. See id. at 255.
193. See id. at 254 n.15. Judge Lynch wrote the following:
[I]f this were a claim brought by a student who had been excluded from elec
tion to the editorial board [of the newspaper] on account of her race, and the
school officials [had] declined to intervene, the analysis would focus on Ii dif
ferent decision and most likely would reach a different result.
Id. (emphasis added).
194. As previously stated, variable state action analysis keys different state action
standards to the type of constitutional right at stake, applying a heightened standard to
First Amendment cases and a liberal standard to race discrimination cases. As a practi
cal matter, then, courts will dismiss more alleged First Amendment violations by private
persons. See supra Part I.A.5 for further discussion of variable state action analysis.
195. See supra Part 1.A.3 for a discussion of the sequential approach.
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the majority's use of this heightened state action standard by chal
lenging its acceptance of the variable state action approach. This
Part will suggest that the variable state action approach undermines
judicial accountability and fails to give equal consideration to all
alleged fundamental rights violations. 196 Third, this Part suggests
that courts should use what will be termed an "Equal Consideration
Approach" to state action analysis; they should apply the same
state action standard-the more liberal totality approach-to all al
leged fundamental rights violations. Finally, this Part will suggest
that, under the facts of Yeo, applying the more liberal totality ap
proach would support a finding of state action. 197 As such, the
Note concludes, the First Circuit in Yeo should have decided Doug
las Yeo's First Amendment complaint on the merits.
A.

The Majority's Use of the Sequential Approach

With the sequential approach, a court finds state action by ex
amining each nexus factor in isolation to determine if, by itself, it is
sufficient to turn private conduct into state action. 198 Judge Lynch,
in her majority opinion in Yeo, found no state action after she dis
posed of three theories for finding state action. 199 She first ana
lyzed whether the school actually made or controlled the editorial
decisions, and she found it did not control them since the record did
not indicate otherwise. zoo Second, she dismissed the claim that the
school's inaction constituted state action since the school had no
affirmative duty to act.Z01 Finally, Judge Lynch used the nexus anal
ysis to determine whether the students' independent acts could be
fairly attributed to the school.2°Z It was pursuant to this third the
ory, the nexus analysis, that Judge Lynch used the sequential ap
196. See infra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of these arguments.
197. See supra Part 1.A.2 for a discussion of the totality approach.
198. Recall that nexus factors include: a state compelling, encouraging, or assist
ing the private person's challenged conduct; or, a private person's conduct having suffi
cient contacts with the state vis-a-vis regulations, mutual benefits (symbiotic
relationship) or direct or special funding. See supra Part 1.A.1 for further discussion of
the nexus factors.
199. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 251 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998). For a further discussion of Yeo, see supra Part
II.D.l.
200. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 251-52.
201. See id. at 252-53. Judge Lynch also squashed the suggestion that an affirma
tive duty might derive from the existence of a "symbiotic relationship" between the
publication and the school, or from a traditional government function of running a
school. See id. at 253.
202. See id.
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proach associated with variable state action analysis. 203
In performing her nexus analysis, Judge Lynch analyzed nexus
factors in isolation, dismissing each one when it alone was insuffi
cient to implicate state action. For example, first she analyzed
whether state regulation of the students' activities was sufficient to
find state action. 204 Next she analyzed whether state subsidy of the
students' publications rose to a sufficient level to find state ac
tion.205 She concluded that each nexus factor, by itself, was insuffi
203. In fact, Judge Lynch prefaces her state action analysis by first defending the
variable state action thesis. For example, she writes the following:
The modem state action decisions of the Supreme Court do not rely on a
single analytic model applied regardless of the fact patterns involved .... The
analytic model used must take account of the specific constitutional claim being
asserted, here, one under the First Amendment. Cf. Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981) (state action inquiry shifts depending on constitu
tional question asked). "Faithful adherence to the 'state action' requirement
... requires careful attention to the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint."
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982).
Yeo, 131 F.3d at 249 (emphasis added) (parallel citations omitted).
Judge Lynch's Supreme Court citations, however, do not support this approach.
First, regarding Polk County v. Dodson, the state action question shifts, as Judge Lynch
herself admitted, not based on the content of the complaint but based on the defend
ant's role in the context of the complaint. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying
text. Second, and more importantly, her quote from Blum, when placed in its context,
does not mean, as Judge Lynch suggested, that a court must look to the plaintiffs com
plaint and identify the constitutional claim prior to its state action analysis. Instead, the
Court in Blum looked to the plaintiffs complaint to determine if the challenged action
attached to state regulations or procedures or whether it attached solely to a private
person's decision. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003. This determination will change the focus
of the state action analysis because state action is more easily identified in the former
than in the latter case. Importantly, in Blum, the Court did not find that state action
analysis begins by looking to the plaintiffs complaint to identify the constitutional claim
at stake. As discussed supra note 76, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether
courts should key their state action analysis to the constitutional claim at stake. The
following passage from Blum contains Lynch's quote and puts it in its proper context.
Faithful adherence to the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires careful attention to the gravamen of the plaintiffs com
plaint. In this case, respondents objected to the involuntary discharge or trans
fer of Medicaid patients by their nursing homes without certain procedural
safeguards.... They have named as defendants state officials responsible for
administering the Medicaid program in New York. These officials are also
responsible for regulating nursing homes in the State, including those in which
respondents were receiving care. But respondents are not challenging particu
lar state regulations or procedures, and their arguments concede that the deci
sion to discharge or transfer a patient originates not with state officials, but
with nursing homes that are privately owned and operated. Their lawsuit,
therefore, seeks to hold state officials liable for the actions ofprivate parties . ...
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
204. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254.
205. See id.
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cient because the extent of each alone was de minimis.206
Importantly, however, Judge Lynch acknowledged that the
above factors, together with numerous other nexus factors, "sup
port[ed] Yeo's argument" for state action. 207 For example, she
noted that the Yearbook centered on a public high school class, and
the newspaper was named Lexington High School Musket. 208 She
also noted that besides state subsidies supporting the publications,
public school officials advised the students in producing these publi
cations. Moreover, the "newspaper exist[ed] in the form it did be
cause the school authorities and state law permit[ted] it to do
so. "209 In addition, Judge Lynch noted that the publications pro
vided "explicit educational value" and credentials for the students,
achieved educational goals for the school, and that the students
worked on these publications on school grounds and sometimes
during school hours. 210
But Judge Lynch dismissed these other nexus factors, which to
gether appeared to support state action, as irrelevant given the con
text in which the students made their decision. 211 According to
Judge Lynch, the" 'nexus' argument turns on context," and the stu
dents had taken on private roles within the context of their public
setting.212 They did so, she noted, in the same way as a public de
fender does when she assumes her role as counsel to her client.213
In such a case, the Supreme Court has held that the public de
fender's actions are no longer attributable to the state. 214
We can distinguish, however, the case of a public defender as
suming a private role in her duties as public counsel, and the logic
behind it, from the situation presented in Yeo. The Supreme Court
held that a public defender's decisions are not attributable to the
state because "it is the constitutional obligation of the State to re
spect the professional independence of the public defenders whom
206. See id. Here, Judge Lynch cites Rendell·Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840
(1982), for the point that even extensive funding is insufficient by itself to find state
action. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 253.
207. Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254.
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). See supra note 147
and accompanying text for further discussion of Dodson.
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it engages."215 However, the State has no constitutional obligation
to respect the independence of student decisions regarding school
publications. 216 Additionally, unlike a public defender, a student
has no strict duty of loyalty to a third person such as a client. 217 As
such, the analogy between the students' actions in Yeo and a public
defender's is misplaced since the students' actions are neither con
stitutionally protected nor ethically required. 218 Judge Lynch, then,
inappropriately relied on the public defender analogy to avoid nu
merous nexus indicia that together appeared to support state ac
tion. 219 Thus, to deny state action, Judge Lynch avoided using the
more liberal state action standard associated with the totality ap
proach and instead embraced a heightened state action standard as
sociated with the sequential approach.220
B.

Problems with Using Variable State Action Analysis:
Should Finding State Action Be More Difficult in
First Amendment Cases than in Racial
Discrimination Cases?

The majority in Yeo used the sequential approach's heightened
state action standard to conclude that no state action existed. 221
But it conceded that had the constitutional right at stake been one
of racial discrimination, instead of the First Amendment, it would
have likely found state action. 222 In racial discrimination cases,
courts have primarily used the liberal state action standard associ
215. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321-22.
216. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,266-70 (1988) (holding
that school officials may delete articles from student newspapers).
217. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321 (holding that, in part, a public defender's duty
of loyalty to her client makes her actions not amenable to administrative direction from
the state because that duty requires strict allegiance to her client).
218. Cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 51 (1988) (finding state action where a pri
vate doctor contracted with the state to provide medical care in a prison because, unlike
a public defender, a doctor's "professional and ethical obligation to make independent
medical judgments [do] not set him in conflict with the State and other prison
authorities").
219. Judge Lynch noted that given these factors "[i]t is a close question whether
the injury caused here is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of government
authority." Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 254 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,622 (1991», cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
220. See supra Part I.A.5 and citations therein for a discussion of varying state
action standards and their associated constitutional claims.
221. See supra Part III.A for further explanation.
222. See supra note 193 for Judge Lynch's statement that supports this claim.
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ated with the totality approach.223 In Yeo, the First Circuit chose to
use a heightened state action standard to address Yeo's First
Amendment claim because it embraced a variable state action ap
proach, keying state action standards to the offensiveness of the al
leged constitutional violation. 224
Should courts vary the state action analysis based on the con
stitutional violation alleged? To defend this practice would require
courts to rank fundamental constitutional rights in a hierarchy of
importance for purposes of reaching the merits.225 Under this ap
proach, courts would decide that someone who has been racially
discriminated against ought to have a better chance of having his or
her day in court than someone whose speech has been suppressed.
The alternative would be for courts to apply the same state action
standard to all fundamental constitutional rights. 226
1.

Problems with the Variable State Action Approach

Some courts have found that ranking fundamental constitu
tional rights is inappropriate for state action analysis. 227 These
223. See supra Part 1.A.5 for a discussion of the use of a liberal state action stan
dard for race discrimination cases.
224. See Yeo, 131 F.3d. at 249 & n.6.
225. Recall that the issue here is whether one can overcome the threshold test of
state action to prevent the court from dismissing the case before it reaches the constitu
tional merits. Thus, even though the courts treat First Amendment rights and rights
against racial discrimination as fundamental, by making it easier to dismiss free speech
rights courts implicitly rank them lower, and find them to be less protected, than rights
against race discrimination. This difference in ranking is not self-evident. In fact, the
reverse may be true since protecting free speech provides the very groundwork for a
society of laws within which people can argue for and defend racial equality.
226. A right is fundamental when it is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people" that fair and enlightened system of justice would not be possible without
it. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); accord Washington v. Glucksburg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (determining a fundamental right by looking at whether the
right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition").
227. See Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 485 (E.D.
Pa. 1974). Judge Higginbotham wrote the following:
Often, it would seem, courts have been influenced in their determinations of
the preliminary, jurisdictional question-whether "state action" exists-by the
particular invidiousness of the constitutional violation alleged. When viewed
in this context, defendants[ ] ... implicitly suggest[ ] that courts generally, and
this Court in particular, should be more reluctant to find "state action" in
cases which do not involve racial discrimination. I decline to accept that sug
gestion. It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to arrange federal constitu
tional rights in an ascending hierarchy of value. What is clear is that any
deprivation of such a right, whether to the equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment or to the freedoms of speech and
association as guaranteed by the First Amendment, is a matter of extreme im
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courts have asserted that because the Supreme Court has deemed a
right fundamental, courts should treat any alleged violation of that
right with an equal level of state action inquiry.228 In other words,
whether one asserts a right against discrimination or a right to free
speech, the courts have recognized that in either case the assertion
is extremely important to the person suffering the deprivation, and
courts should be equally sensitive to such deprivations. 229
Courts have also asserted that variable analysis allows judges
to rank fundamental constitutional values without adequate justifi
cation.230 That is, a court will assign a particular state action stan
portance to the person who suffers the deprivation. It is equally clear that the
courts should be especially sensitive to any such deprivation, whether it in
volves a black man who is refused service in a segregated restaurant, ... or
two faculty members who were fired for speaking their minds about a univer
sity's publication policies, as is purportedly the case here. The freedoms of
speech and association have been held so fundamental to the concept of ordered
liberty that they have been incorporated into the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 u.S. 229 (1963).
Clearly, then, the courts should be alert to their infringement "under color of'
state law, and quick to vindicate them if they have in fact been curtailed.
Id. at 485 n.ll (emphasis added); see also Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 154 (3d
Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 823
n.7 (7th Cir. 1975); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 439
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Keller v. Kate Maremount Found., 365 F. Supp. 798, 801 (N.D. Cal.
1972), affd sub nom. Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors,
504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F.
Supp. 593, 598 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit questioned the continued validity of its variable analysis approach.
See Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 570-74 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Tavoloni
v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 984 F. Supp. 196,204 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
228. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 6 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978); Isaacs, 385 F. Supp.
at 485 n.ll; see also Jakosa, supra note 77, at 194 (criticizing the variable state action
approach as "artificial and unjust").
In fact, the First Circuit itself has rejected this variable state action approach when
applied to fundamental rights. See Downs, 574 F.2d at 7 n.5 (noting that even if the
court were to adopt the Second Circuit's "flexible approach to state action analysis" it
would "be inclined to group infringements of fundamental rights and racial discrimina
tion together"); see also Lamb v Rantoul, 561 F.2d 409, 411 (1st Cir. 1977) (expressing
reservations over using the variable state action approach); cf. Fletcher v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 931 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying a heightened state
action standard in an economic due process case where a depositor claimed that a bank
violated her due process rights when it used without notice the plaintiffs checking ac
count deposits to setoff her bank credit card debt). See infra Part III.C for further
discussion of the First Circuit's approach.
229. See Isaacs, 385 F. Supp. at 485 n.ll.
230. See Parks, 556 F.2d at 154. Writing in concurrence, Judge Gibbons criticized
this masking of judicial reasoning:
The result of [the] adoption [of variable state action analysis] would be to
hinge the availability of the national law applicable to the states by virtue of
the fourteenth amendment not on the relationship between the actor and the
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dard based on the constitutional violation alleged and then apply
that standard without ever having to articulate why it assigned more
or less importance to the constitutional value at issue. 231
If a court is to treat free speech with less importance than ra
cial equality, the court ought to "articulate [its] reasons for tilting
the scale one way or the other."232 In failing to provide such rea
sons, courts silently rule on the relative value of fundamental rights,
which undermines judicial accountability.233
2.

A Balancing Approach to State Action Analysis?

To overcome the lack of judicial accountability associated with
the variable state action doctrine, some authorities argue for jet
tisoning the state action requirement and instead balancing the sub
stantive interests of the parties up front. 234 Under this approach, a
state but on a prejudgment by the judge, state or federal, of the importance of
the rights being claimed on his subjective scale of constitutional values. It is
true, of course, that in discussing the merits of claims for constitutional protec
tion we make evaluations of the relative worth of competing claims of the
opposing party and of society. But when we do so on the merits we are forced
to articulate our reasons for tilting the scale one way or the other. By the device
of a "non-decision," turning the result on the absence of state action in a par
ticular context, a judge makes subjective social policy decisions without expos
ing those reasons.
Id. (Gibbons, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
231. The problem of not providing judicial reasons for assigning lesser impor
tance to First Amendment rights is especially troubling in the case of Yeo. Yeo's First
Amendment complaint rested on the argument that the high school newspaper and
yearbook were limited public forums, which would trigger the court's use of strict scru
tiny analysis to Yeo's claim because the advertising ban was based on the content of his
ad. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *16 (1st Clr. June
6,1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
By dismissing the case, the court never analyzed the important and difficult First
Amendment question of whether the high school publications were public or non-pub
lic forums. In fact, the panel decision is proof that this question is not so easily re
solved. See id. at *9, *29; see also Yeo, 131 F.3d at 255 (Torruella, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the importance of discussing the public forum issue).
232. Parks, 556 F.2d at 154.
233. The value of judicial accountability derives from the value that our legal sys
tem places on deliberating (reasoning) about legal rights. This value of deliberation is
respected only if courts leave a record of their reasons, which other courts can decide
either to follow, because they agree with the reasoning, or to overrule, because they
find the reasoning mistaken. A lack of judicial accountability, then, undermines the
importance of deliberation to the legal system.
234. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503,
540 (1985) (arguing that balancing substantive interests "would force the courts clearly
to identify and define the conflicting liberties, enhancing understanding of each of the
rights at stake"); see also Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analy
sis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. Cr. REv. 221,
231; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 3, § 12.5, at 507-09. The Supreme Court has
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court would resolve the state action question as follows. First, it
would identify the constitutionally protected interests of the victim.
Second, it would identify the constitutionally protected interests of
the actor. Third, the court would balance those interests. 235 The
court's ability to strike this balance rather than find significant state
involvement would determine the outcome of the state action
decision. 236
Under the balancing approach, in other words, the state always
acts, since it chooses to make a change or tolerate the status quo.
The so-called "state action requirement" is "merely a tool for sepa
rating out those nongovernmental activities whose existence so im
pairs certain fundamental values that they are proscribed by the
Constitution."237 The Constitution, therefore, "does not require
the judiciary to determine whether a state has 'acted,' but whether a
never adopted this approach, but some authorities suggest that the Court engages in it
covertly under the state action rubric. See Esper, supra note 13, at 678; see also
Chemerinsky, supra, at 540.
235. See Esper, supra note 13, at 677-78. An alternative formulation would be the
following: "If the importance of the [complainant's] right is not clearly greater than that
of the challenged practice, the effect of the practice on the right does not violate the
[Constitution]." Glennon & Nowak, supra note 234, at 231; cf. Kenneth L. Karst &
Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection,
1967 SUP. Cr. REv. 39,75 (defending a more complex balancing approach, which takes
into account "the value of the objective of the challenged conduct (state or private), the
seriousness of the impact of that conduct on the constitutionally protected interest in
equality, and, where pertinent, the availability of alternative means for achieving the
same objective with a lesser invasion of the interest in equality").
236. In fact, although the court in Yeo did not use the balancing approach per se,
there is evidence that it was balancing First Amendment interests as a prerequisite to its
state action determination, and that this balancing influenced that determination. For
example, the court wrote the following:
There are expressive interests involved on both sides of this case. Yeo's
are obvious. Those on the other side are perhaps less obvious. The identifica
tion of these interests puts the state action question in context.
If the actions by the students are themselves state action or may be attrib
uted to the school officials and provide the basis for state action, the inevitable
legal consequence will be some level of judicial scrutiny of the students' edito
rial judgments. The inevitable practical consequence will be greater official
control of the students' editorial judgments. Both consequences implicate the
students' First Amendment interests, which are far from negligible .... In
addition, the defendant school officials themselves have an interest in their
autonomy to make educational decisions. The officials have determined that
the best way to teach journalism skills is to respect in the students' editorial
judgments a degree of autonomy similar to that exercised by professional jour
nalists. That choice by the officials parallels the allocation of responsibility for
editorial judgments made by the First Amendment itself.
Yeo, 131 F.3d at 249-50 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
237. Glennon & Nowak, supra note 234, at 259.
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state has 'deprived' someone of a guaranteed right."238
One advantage of this approach is that it requires judicial ac
countability by forcing the court to justify how it has balanced im
portant constitutional values. Instead of masking the reasoning for
denying state action behind a prearranged hierarchy of rights, a
court is forced to defend the relative weight it is assigning to a par
ticular constitutional right as it would if it were analyzing a constitu
tional claim on its merits. 239
The balancing approach is problematic, however, because it es
sentially eliminates the state action requirement. 24o The approach
is premised on the idea that all action is state action-either action
that changes behavior or inaction that tolerates the status quo.
Such a premise diverges too far from the history and practice of the
state action doctrine. The traditional state action doctrine assumes
that a distinction between state and private action is not so blurred
as to be invisible. Thus, a major flaw in the balancing approach is
that it goes too far by eliminating a distinction accepted since the
Civil Rights Cases. 241
C.

An Equal Consideration Approach to State Action Analysis

A better approach to state action analysis would incorporate
the balancing approach's virtue of requiring judicial accountability,
while at the same time preserving the state action doctrine. An ap
proach that would achieve both goals would give equal considera
tion to all alleged fundamental rights violations by using the more
liberal totality approach for finding state action. Using this "Equal
Consideration Approach," courts would preserve the distinction be
tween state and private action, thereby upholding the state action
doctrine itself. More importantly, they would preserve the integrity
of fundamental constitutional rights by facilitating judicial account
ability for their value and rank.
Under an "Equal Consideration Approach," courts would ap
ply the same state action standard to all alleged fundamental consti
238. Id. at 229.
239. See Karst & Horowitz, supra note 235, at 75 for a complex balancing ap
proach that resembles a court's analysiS of a constitutional claim on its merits.
240. Cf. Esper, supra note 13, at 680-82 (noting other difficulties with the balanc
ing approach).
241. 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (affirming the essential dichotomy between state and
private conduct). Moreover, eliminating the state action requirement is also contrary to
explicit constitutional text. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("No State shall ... nor
shall any State . .." (emphasis added»; U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no
law ..." (emphasis added».
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tutional rights violations. 242 Accordingly, each claimant's alleged
constitutional deprivation would receive equal judicial treatment.
Giving each fundamental constitutional right equal considera
tion does not mean that each claimant's constitutional interest re
ceives the same value and rank. When analyzing rights on the
merits, a court will rule that some interests are more important than
others; it will balance competing interests as it must in all constitu
tional decisions on the merits. Receiving equal consideration sim
ply means that each alleged constitutional rights violation confronts
the same hurdle before reaching the merits. This approach pro
vides for equal consideration (a similar state action hurdle) because
the claimant must overcome the state action hurdle to avoid a dis
missal. To raise the bar only on some fundamental constitutional
rights would not sufficiently respect those other constitutional
claimants and the deprivations they allege. 243
Thus, if the same state action standard should apply to all fun
damental rights, then finding state action in First Amendment cases
should not be harder than finding it in racial discrimination cases.
Moreover, if the totality approach's liberal state action standard
would have supported a finding of state action in Yeo ,244 then the
First Circuit should have applied that standard and not dismissed
the case.

242. In fact, the First Circuit has supported this approach. See Downs v. Sawtelle,
574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978). After noting his reservations about the Second Circuit's use
of the variable state action approach, Chief Judge Coffin wrote: "Even were we to
adopt such an approach, however, we would be inclined to group infringements of fun
damental rights and racial discrimination together for the purpose of state action analy
sis just as they receive comparable scrutiny in equal protection cases." Id. at 6 n.5.
(emphasis added); see also Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 13-15 (1st Cir. 1972) (finding
that an ejectment action instituted to violate tenant's First Amendment rights by mobile
home park owner whose monopoly had been created by zoning was an application of
New Hampshire landlord and tenant statute and amounted to state action even though
the statute was neutral on its face); cf. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d
1073, 1084 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Writing in dissent, Judge
Goldberg argued that the two issues (race discrimination and free speech) should, in
some instance, be treated the same. He writes that a court would no doubt review "a
decision by the students [of a college run paper] to exclude blacks from participation in
the newspaper staff as a decision imbued with state action. To my mind the pure 'state
action' question should be the same in the first amendment context." Mississippi Gay
Alliance, 536 F.2d at 1085 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
243. This claim assumes that receiving sufficient respect requires having an equi
table opportunity to have one's constitutional rights addressed on the merits.
244. See infra Part III.D for an application of the totality standard to the facts of
Yeo.
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Applying the Equal Consideration Approach to the Facts
o/Yeo

The Equal Consideration Approach recommends that courts
apply the. same state action standard to all fundamental constitu
tional rights. That standard, this Note assumes, could be the more
liberal standard associated with the totality approach, which courts
apply in race discrimination cases. This final section will apply that
standard to the facts of Yeo and suggest that the First Circuit could
have found state action under the totality approach.
Unlike the sequential approach, the totality approach does not
look at each nexus factor in isolation and then dismiss completely
its possible contribution to the aggregate. Instead, under the total
ity approach, courts consider each nexus factor together with the
others and analyze whether, in the aggregate, they constitute state
action. 245 Given the number of nexus indicia present in the context
of the students' ed.itorial decision, this section will apply the totality
approach to the facts of Yeo and argue that under such an analysis
state action existed.
The relevant factors in Yeo, which analyzed in the aggregate
would support a finding of state action, are the following: (1) the
Musket and the Yearbook were official public high school publica
tions used to represent the school;246 (2) public high school students
produced the pUblications; (3) the public perceived that the publica
tions bore the imprimatur of the public school;247 (4) a state law
provided students with decisional authority;248 (5) state officials su
pervised the students and received extra compensation for those re
sponsibilities;249 (6) the high school principal controlled the bank
245. See supra Part I.A.2 for further discussion of the totality approach.
246. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1975)
(finding state action, where a private baseball little league denied a ten year-old girl the
right to play based on her gender, because, in part, the little league's use of the city-kept
baseball diamonds "undoubtedly took on in the public consciousness a semi-official
character, little different from recreational programs under direct City sponsorship").
247. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, No. 96-1623, 1997 WL 292173, at *6 (1st Cir.
June 6, 1997), rev'd en bane, 131 F.3d 241 (1st Cir. 1997), eert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060
(1998); see also Falzarazo v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 511 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding no
state action, where tenants of a federally subsidized housing project sued their land
lords, because "[t]he badge of 'public entity' cannot be fairly attached to [the housing
projects]").
248. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82 (1996). See supra note 112 for the text of
the statute. Originally the statute was elective, but on July 14, 1988, "in response to the
[Hazelwood] decision, the Massachusetts legislature made the provision mandatory."
Abrams & Goodman, supra note 112, at 730 n.l72; see also, Phillips, supra note 112.
249. The advisors to the Yearbook and the Musket, both Lexington High School
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checking accounts of both publications;25o (7) the school officials
retained final authority over the publications and were prepared to
use it in cases where students wanted to publish obscene mate
rial;251 (8) both publications received state financial assistance;252
(9) a mutually beneficial relationship existed between the students
and the high school;253 (10) the students used state facilities;254 and
(11) the students represented the school in commercial transactions
with third parties. 255
In the aggregate, these factors should support a finding of state
action under the liberal standard of the totality approach. Under
this approach, recall, no direct or overt government participation is
required. Instead, to borrow language from Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority,256 "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circum
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private con
duct be attributed its true significance."257 Echoing this language,
the First Circuit itself has held that "[t]he essence of Burton . .. is
that the relationship between the state and the private [party] may
be so intertwined that the state will be held responsible for conduct
teachers, received about $2,000 and $1,373, respectively. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington,
131 F.3d 241, 243-44 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
250. See Yeo, 1997 WL 292173, at *6.
251. See id.
252. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 243-44.
253. This relationship existed in two ways. First, the school fulfilled its educa
tional objectives, and the students received skills and credentials. Second, the students
funded their publications from money received from the commercial transactions with
third parties in the town, and the town had the prospect of monetary benefit. See id. at
258 (Stahl, J., concurring) .
. .254. The Yearbook used the LHS buildings and facilities; the Musket had a
mailbox at the school. See id.; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 23 (1st Cir.
1981) (noting that the strongest state action factor in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), was the use of public property), affd, 457 U.S. 830
(1982); Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975) (relying
heavily on the use of public property as a factor for finding state action in a sex discrim
ination case).
255. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 259 (Stahl, J., dissenting).
256. 365 U.S. 715 (1960).
257. Id. at 722 (emphasis added). A number of courts have used Burton's totality
approach to analyze alleged First Amendment violations. See Carlin Communications,
Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 1987); Interna
tional Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Air Canada, 727 F.2d 253, 254 (2d Cir.
1984); Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Jensen v. Farrell Lines,
Inc., 625 F.2d 379, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Reitz v. Persing, 831 F. Supp. 410, 416 (M.D. Pa.
1993); Pleasant v. Lovell, No. 83-F-2251, 1990 WL 393737, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 28,
1990); Henry v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale, 424 F. Supp. 633, 639 (N.D. Miss. 1976);
Curtis v. Rosso & Mastracco, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 804, 806 (E.D. Va. 1976); Isaacs v.
Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 487-88 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Keller v.
Kate Maremount Found., 365 F. Supp. 798, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1972).

228

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:183

with which it had no direct connection."258
In a variety of earlier decisions, the First Circuit's state action
analysis was consistent with this conclusion. For example, in Fortin
v. Darlington Little League, Inc. ,259 the First Circuit found state ac
tion in a sex discrimination case by analyzing an expanded set of
state action indicia. There, a ten-year-old girl was denied a right to
play little league baseball because of her gender. In finding state
action, the court went beyond the factors of regulation and financial
assistance and focused on the private little league's relationship
with the city. The little league not only used and depended on the
city-provided baseball diamonds, but the city accommodated the
league's practice and playing schedule to the virtual exclusion of
other members of the community.260 As such, the court pointed
out that this gave the league a "semi-official character" in the public
consciousness. 261
The First Circuit's analysis of nexus indicia in Lamb v.
Rantou/262 also supports interpreting the factors in Yeo as sufficient
for state action under the totality approach. In Lamb, a female
school teacher at a private postgraduate school-the Rhode Island
School of Design-alleged sex discrimination when the school de
nied her tenure. In its denial of state action, the First Circuit identi
fied a variety of nexus indicia, which it held to be insufficient. The
indica included the following: (1) the city conveyed a building to the
school (and the school gave the city an easement in other property
for historical purposes); (2) the state required five of the forty-three
school directors to be city officials; (3) the school received some
government subsidies; (4) the state required the school to' submit
annual reports; and (5) the school was required to allow the state to
conduct inspections.263 Importantly, the difference between Lamb
and Fortin turns on, in part, the use of state facilities and land, and
the appearance that the entity is official in the public's eye. More
over, and even more importantly, Lamb declined to apply the more
liberal totality approach in a sex discrimination case,264 and instead
relied for its state action analysis on Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
258.
Cir. 1978»
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Rendell-Baker, 641 F.2d at 22 (citing Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1,8-9 (1st
(emphasis added).
514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975).
See id. at 347.
See id.
561 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1977).
See id. at 410.
See id. at 411.
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Co. ,265 which used a heightened state action standard associated
with the sequential approach. Whether the court should have ap
plied the totality approach to a sex discrimination case is beyond
the scope of this Note. However, given that the First Circuit later
endorsed applying the totality approach to all fundamental
rights,266 Lamb suggests, anyway, that the number and variety of
nexus indicia in that case may have been sufficient had it applied
the liberal approach. That is especially relevant given that in Yeo
the state action nexus indicia included, among others, the use of
public land and facilities, and the appearance in the public's eye
that the publications were official.Z67
Nevertheless, the number and quality of nexus indicia in Yeo
implicate all told a sufficient contact with the state to satisfy the
liberal state action standard defended in this Note. This conclusion
is not only consistent with prior First Circuit state action analysis,
but with Judge Lynch's own assessment of the facts.268 Their cumu
lative impact provides a sufficient nexus between the students' deci
sions and the school to create state action. The public high school
students in Yeo depended on the school for the existence of the
yearbook and the newspaper, and the school itself provided edito
rial opportunities only to its students. The school needs students to
generate a yearbook and a newspaper-each playing an important
265. 419 u.s. 345, 358-59 (1974) (finding no state action when a private utility
company did not provide due process when it terminated a customer's service).
266. See Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 7 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding state action
where }! private community hospital allegedly conspired to sterilize the plaintiff, a deaf
mute, against her will).
267. Interestingly, these two factors, use of public property and official appear
ance, were significant in Fortin, which was also a sex discrimination case. This suggests
that these factors may be enough even under a stricter state action standard. Cf.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 1981) (involving the dismissal of a
teacher at a private high school, where the absence of these two factors played a role in
the First Circuit denying state action), affd, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In Falzarano v. United
States, 607 F.2d 506 (1st Cir. 1979), the court denied state action when tenants alleged
procedural due process violations against landlords of a federally subsidized housing
project. The only nexus indicia included zoning regulations, and reduced utility rates
and taxes. These factors, the court held, did not come up to Fortin because the housing
projects were privately owned and "the badge of 'public entity' cannot fairly be at
tached to them." [d. at 511; see also Ponce v. Basketball Federation of Puerto Rico, 760
F.2d 375, 382 n.5 (1st Cir. 1985) (denying state action where a private sporting organiza
tion revoked a player's right to play because of his national origin, and distinguishing
itself from Fortin by noting that the sporting organization did not take on a semi-official
character in the public's eye because the government's accommodations were far less
significant than they were in Fortin).
268. See Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 254 & n.15 (1st Cir. 1997) (en
banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2060 (1998).
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role in the high school's identity-and the students need the public
high school for these opportunities. That is, the public high school
provides the framework within which students make editorial and
advertising decisions. 269 The public high school, in other words,
"has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the
[challenged conduct]."27o In doing so, the students' editorial deci
sions were sufficiently intertwined with the state.
Judge Lynch, in her majority opinion, therefore, should have
considered the combined weight of these factors and more carefully
analyzed whether, taken together, they would suggest the students'
decisions were fairly attributable to the state. Such an analysis
should have occurred as it would have had the case involved race
discrimination. 271 Under the "Equal Consideration Approach,"
therefore, the court might have found state action. 272
CONCLUSION

The First Circuit en banc decision in Yeo has too narrowly in
269. Cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (finding
state action when a plaintiff in a civil case used a peremptory challenge to exclude a
juror on the basis of his race, and noting in its analysis that the government had "cre
ated the legal framework governing the [challenged] conduct" (citation omitted».
270. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
271. See Yeo, 131 F.3d at 254 n.15.
272. The court in Yeo worried that finding state action would effectively "spell
the end" to public school publications, since students could not report or editorialize
without running afoul of the First Amendment's mandate of viewpoint neutrality. See
id. at 258. (Stahl, J., concurring). But this worry is misplaced. The court could have
avoided this consequence if it had ruled on the merits by analyzing the weight and
scope of the student editors' First Amendment rights as editors, and balancing them
against Douglas Yeo's claim to access to the publications. For example, in his concur
ring opinion, Chief Judge Torruella appeared to have wanted to find state action and
discuss the merits because he decided to write separately "to highlight an important
issue that the majority fails to address-the absence of a public forum." Id. at 255 (Tor
ruella, J., concurring). He argued that the students were not intending "to open a fo
rum for all public discourse" and as such they were "permitted to filter out pure
political speech." Id.; cf. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct.
1633, 1644 (1998) (holding that a broadcaster's decision to exclude a political candidate
from a state-owned public television broadcast's political debate "was a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with the First Amend
ment" (emphasis added». Such an analysis would have been more beneficial than the
court's variable state action analysis which treated First Amendment rights as less im
portant than rights of racial equality. In fact, the contrary may be true: First Amend
ment rights may be more important since they constitute the groundwork for a
democracy itself within which the value of racial equality is defended by public argu
ments of law, politics and morality. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147,161
(1939) (noting that the First Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government by
free men").
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terpreted the state action inquiry. In focusing on each nexus factor
in isolation, the court, in essence, overlooked the forest while going
tree to tree. The majority applied a narrow state action analysis
under the assumption that state action analysis should vary with the
type of constitutional violation alleged. As such, the majority ap
plied a higher state action standard to Yeo's First Amendment com
plaint than it would have if his complaint had been one of racial
discrimination.
Keying state action standards to the type of constitutional vio
lations alleged, as the court did in Yeo, is problematic since this
approach fails to impose judicial accountability to explain why
some constitutional rights are ranked higher than others, and be
cause it fails to sufficiently respect each constitutional claimant's
fundamental right violation. This Note suggests that courts should
apply the same state action standard to all fundamental rights,
namely, by using the liberal totality approach currently employed
by courts in racial discrimination cases. This approach promotes
both a sufficient level of judicial accountability and equal respect
for fundamental constitutional rights. As applied to Yeo, this Note
concludes that state action should have been found since the major
ity would have reached a finding of state action had it used the
totality approach. Yeo, therefore, should have had his day in court.

Rory B. Weiner

